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SEX DISCRIMINATION
CATHERINE A. BRODERICK
NEIL 11. COHEN
CHARLES H. KLEIN
I
SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITSI ntroduction.-Despite the rather large number of major sex discrimina-
tion cases decided under the equal protection clause' during the last
four years,2 a clear mode of conceptual analysis has yet to emerge.3 The
growing significance of the Supreme Court's decision in Reed v. Reed,4
Received for publication December 1. 1975.
Catherine A. Broderick, Neil B. Cohen, and Charles H. Klein are staff members of
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1. Although the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment of the
United States Constitution is by its terms applicable only to the states, the Supreme
Court has assumed that an equal protection guarantee underlies the fifth amend-
ment's due process clause, which is applicable to federal action. See Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618, 641-42 (1969); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964); Boiling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). Equal protection claims under the fifth anend-
ment are decided in the same manner as claims under the fourteenth amendment.
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
2. E.g., Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld. 420 U.S.
636 (1975); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484
(1974); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974); Fronticro v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Wiesenfeld, Schlesinger, and Fronticro were
actually decided under the due process clause of the fifth amendment, but emplo)cd
equal protection analysis. See note 1 supra.
3. See generally Women's Rights, 1973/74 Ann. Survey Am. L. 459.
4. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). The plaintiff in Reed challenged a statute which mandated
that if a male and a female of the same entitlement class applied for appointment as
administrator of a decedent's estate, the male be given automatic preference. Id. at 73.
Without contemplating the proposition that sex is a -suspect classification" or that a
"fundamental interest" was involved (see note 6 infra), the Court held that the
statute violated the equal protection clause by giving mandatory preference to males
over females without regard to their individual qualifications as potential estate ad-
ministrators. Id. at 74. The question the Court asked was whether the gender-based
distinction was justified on the basis of criteria substantially related to the objecche
of the statute. It said that the admitted state objective of reducing the workload on
probate courts by eliminating one class of controversy, while not without some
legitimacy, was insufficient to justify an arbitrary classification based only on a
difference in the sex of competing applicants. Id. at 77. Its ruling thus requires a
determination in such situations of the relative capabilities of the competing applicants
to perform the functions in question.
Prior to Reed, the classification created by the statute would hae been judged
according to a minimum rational relationship test and upheld "if an) state of facts
81
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however, is evident in one of its most recent opinions involving Social
Security benefits. In Weinberger v. JViesenteld,5 as in Reed, the Court
found neither a "fundamental right" nor a "suspect classification."() Ac-
cordingly, the classification at issue was not subject to rigid scrutiny
under the Court's two-tier equal protection analysis. Nevertheless, the
gender-based distinction was invalidated on equal protection grounds.7
This section of the article analyzes TViescnjeld's conceptual place in
the constitutional law of sex discrimination and assesses its impact oil
Social Security benefit programs.
reasonably may be couceied to justify [it]." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 2120, 426
(1961). Under that test, a statute was rarely inalidated, since virtually any legislative
classification could be justified under some state of facts. Reed's significance lies Ill
its departure from this pattern. It inialidated the challenged classification without
appl)ing strict scrutiny to it.
5. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
6. In evaluating equal protection claims, the Court has traditionally chosen one
of two standards of review. In cases involving "fundamental interests," e.g., the right
to vote, Dunn v. Blunistein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); the right to travel interstate, Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); the right to appeal a criminal conviction, Gii[fin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); or classifications deemed "inherently suspect," e.g.. lace,
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); or alienage, Graham v. Richairdson, ,103
U.S. 365 (1971), a statute is looked upon with "strict scrutiny" and uphehl only if
justified by a countervailing, compelling state interest. Where neither a fundaumental
right nor a suspect class is involved, a legislative classification has been traditionally
upheld if it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.
Three years ago, it appeared that the Court was on the verge of declaring sex i
"suspect classification." In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), four justices
of the Court's eight-justice majority, in a plurality opinion by Justice Brennan
(joined by Justices Douglas, White, and Marshall), went on record as favoring that
view. Id. at 682. In cases since Frontiero, however, the plurality in favor of teclarnhg
sex a suspect classification has not emerged as a majority. See, e.g., Stanton v. Stanton,
421 U.S. 7 (1975), where the Court found it "unnecessary to decide in this case wiether
a classification based on sex is inherently suspect." Id. at 13.
7. See also Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975). The plaintiff in Stanton, seeking
continuance of child support payments under a divorce decree, challenged a Utah
statute providing different ages of majority for males (21) and females (18). Il. at 9.
The Court, in determining the statute to be unconstitutionally discriminatory it the
context of child support, found Reed to be controlling. The test it applied wiaq
whether the different treatment accorded by the statute was based on criteria hal ing
a fair and substantial relation to the objective of the statute. Id. at 11. The purpose
of the statute, acknowledged by the lower court to be the assurance to the child of
parental support while receiving his education, was no longer sufficiently related to it
difference in the sex of the dependents to justify the classification. In vicw of the
expansion of women's activities in all walks of life, the Court said, "[i]f a specific([
age of minority is required for the boy in order to assure him parental support while
he attains his education and training so, too, it is for the girl." Id. at 15. It conclude([
that "tunder any test-compelling state interest, or rational basis, or something in
between-[the Utah statute] in the context of child support, does not survive :iu equal
protection attack." Id. at 17. Justice Rehnquist dissented, adhering to the Court'q
policy that "unnecessary constitutional adjudication" should be avoided. Id. at 20
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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JViesenfeld and the Invigoiated Rational Relationship Test.-
Stephen Wiesenfeld, a technical consultant, married his wife, Paula, a
school teacher, in November 1970. Less than two Nears later, Paula
died in childbirth, leaving Stephen with the sole rcsponsibilit for tie
care of their newborn son. s By the time of her death, Paula had taught
school for seven )ears and had contributed maximum Social Securit% pa%-
ments each year from her salary." Her income had exceeded Stephe&'S
at all times during their marriage. 0
After Paula's death, Stephen applied for Social Securit% benefit-
for himself and his infant son. He was granted child's insurance bene-
fits for his son,1 but was denied benefits for himself, since the relevant
section of the Social Security Act, section -102(g), protided benefits to
widows in his situation, but not to widowers. ' -' Stephen thereupon filed
suit seeking a declaration that section 402(g) was unconstitutional since
men and women were treated differently, an injunction restraining the
8. NViesenfeld v. Secretary of HEWV, 367 F. Supp. 981, 984 D.N.J. 1973) (three-
judge court).
9. Id.
10. Stephen's total income in the )cars 1970, 1971, and 1972 was S7763; Paula's
income for the same period was S27,330. Id.
11. Id. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (Supp. IV, 1974) provides child's inurance b nefits to
(1) Every child . .. of an individual . . . who dies a fully or currently insured
individual, if such child-
(B) at the time such application was filed wvas unmarried and ii) either had not
attained the age of 18 or was a full-time student and had not attained the age
of 22,
12. 367 F. Supp. at 984-85. 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1970. Supp. IV, 1974), provides in
part:
(g) Mother's insurance benefits.
(1) The widow and every surlihing divorced mothcr . .. of an individual who
died a fully or currently insured individual, if such widow or surviving divorced
mother-
(A) is not married,
(B) is not entitled to a widow's insurance benefit,
(C) is not entitled to old-age insurance benefits ...
(D) has filed application for mother's insurance benefits, or uas entitled to
wife's insurance benefits on the basis of the wages and self.employment income of
such individual for the month preceding the month in which fe died.
(E) at the time of filing such application has in her care a child of such in-
dividual entitled to a child's insurance benefit, and
(F) in the case of a surviving divorced mother-
(i) the child referred to in subparagraph (E) is her son, daughter .Ot legallk
adopted child, and
(ii) the benefits referred to in such subparagraph are pa.ablc on the basis of
such individual's wages and self-emploxment income,
shall . .. be entitled to a mother's insurance benefit ....
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denial of benefits under section 402(g), and payment of past benefits
due.' 3
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Wiesen-
feld.' a It first applied the traditional rational relationship test, which
requires that a legislative classification be upheld unless it bears no
rational relationship to any legitimate governmental objective. 15 Under
this test, the court found that the statute represented "a rational at-
tempt by Congress to protect women and families who have lost the
male head of the household."'" Announcing, however, that it was
persuaded by the plurality opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson17 that
sex is a suspect classification, the district court proceeded to apply the
test of strict judicial scrutiny. Under this test, the court found the
statute invalid not because it discriminated against male survivors but
because it discriminated against female wage earners by denying their
spouses and children the Social Security benefits accorded male wage
earners who earned the same salary and made the same Social Security
payments.' 8
The district court in Wiesenfeld explicitly rejected the proposition
that Reed established a new, intermediate test for the constitutionality
of legislative sex discrimination.' 9 Reed, it pointed out, relied strongly
on the half-century-old case of F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,2 0
which "can hardly be considered as a strong foundation for a 'new' equal
protection standard."2'-
On appeal, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the lower
court holding,22 but on different analytical grounds.2 3 The Court agreed
13. 367 F. Supp. at 983-84.
14. Id. at 981, 991.
15. Id. at 989-90.
16. Id. at 990. In so doing, the court rejected WViesenfeld's argument that, inas-
much as the congressional purpose of § 402(g) was to provide for the families of
deceased iwage earners, the classification is arbitrary and unconstitutional on the basi%
of Reed. Id. at 989.
17. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
18. 367 F. Supp. at 990-91. The court did say that affirmative legislation to undo
the past discrimination against suspect groups may satisfy a compelling governmental
interest, but because the statute in this case, although designed to protect women,
also discriminates against them, it cannot survive the test. Id. at 991.
19. Id. at 988.
20. 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920), where the Court said that a "classification must be
reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair
and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike."
21. 367 F. Supp. at 988.
22. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975). Justice Douglas took no part in
consideration or decision of the case.
23. Intervening cases involving alleged sex discrimination include Schlesinger v.
Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (see note 40 infra); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974)
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that section 402(g) discriminated against working women by depriving
them of the same protection for their families as was afforded working
men.24 It determined that the classification created by section -102(g)
was indistinguishable from the one invalidated in Frontiero and held
that Frontiero dictated that it be found invalid. ' 5 Justice Brennan's
majority opinion, however, made no mention of sex as a suspect class
justifying rigid scrutiny. The equal protection analysis on which his
opinion in Frontiero was based was noticeably absent in II'iesenfeld,
sacrificed, no doubt, in the interest of obtaining a majority opinion.
Nevertheless, the court relied heavily on the result in Frontiero.
In comparing the section 4 02(g) distinction with that at issue in
Frontiero, the Court focused on the fact that both were premised on
"overbroad generalizations that could not be tolerated under the Con-
stitution."26 The assumption challenged in Fronfiero was that female
spouses of servicemen would normally be dependent upon their hus-
bands, while male spouses of servicewomen would not.27 Similarly, in
Wiesenfeld, the statutory classification was based on the assumption
that the earnings of male workers are vital to the support of their
families but those of female workers are not."2 The fact that tie dis-
tinction in Wiesenfeld was premised on an overbroad generalization
was enough in itself to render it constitutionally impermissible. Since
the differentiation in Frontiero was prohibited, the differentiation in
Wiesenfeld was equally invalid.2 9
Following this rather conclusory ruling, the Court discussed and
rejected the Government's opposing arguments. The Government's main
argument in opposition to Wiesenfeld 3° was that the gender-based
(California disability insurance system, which excludes disability payments for prcg-
nancy, held not to be discrimination based on gender); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351
(1974) (Florida statute giving tax exemption to widows but not widowers held to be
constitutional as a measure designed to ameliorate the effects of past discrimination
against women); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (school board
rule requiring pregnant teachers to take unpaid maternity lcac seeral months before
giving birth held to violate procedural due process by creating an "irrebutable
presumption" that such leaves are needed in every case).
24. 420 U.S. at 645.
25. Id. at 653.
26. Id. at 643, quoting the Court's own explication of Frontiero in Schlesinger v.
Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 507 (1975).
27. 420 U.S. at 643.
28. Id. The Court also noted that the gender-bascd classification in IWiesenfeld
was even "more pernicious" than that in Frontiero, since under the Fronticro statute.
the presumption of male nondependcncy was rebuttable, while the presumption of
§ 402(g) was not. Id. at 645.
29. Id. at 645.
30. An ancillary argument put forth by the Government and rather summarily
rejected by the Court was that because Social Security benefits arc not compensation
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classification was reasonably designed to compensate women as a group
to offset the adverse economic situation many of them still sufferal and
was therefore defensible against an equal protection attack. Justice
Brennan, writing for the Court and relying on Kahn v. Shevin? 2
(decided after the district court's decision in IViesenfeld), conceded
that the appellant's argument, if true, would enable section 402(g) to
survive such an attack.3 3 Justice Brennan noted, however, that "the
mere recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic
shield which protects against any inquiry into the actual purposes under-
lying a statutory scheme." 34 Citing to a rather complete legislative
history,3 5 Justice Brennan concluded that the purpose of section 102(g),
rather than being compensatory in nature, was instead "to provide
children deprived of one parent with the opportunity for the personal
attention of the other" by enabling the surviving parent to remain at
home to care for the child.36 Given that purpose, he held, the gender-
based distinction in the section was entirely irrational,37 insofar as it
accomplished its goal only if the surviving parent was the mother. Since
for work done, covered females need not be provided the same benefits as covered
males. Id. at 646. For this proposition the appellant relied primarily on Flemming v.
Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960), in which the Court held that the interest of a covered
employee in future Social Security benefits is "noncontractual," because "each worker's
benefits, though flowing from the contributions he made to the national economy
while actively employed, are not dependent on the degree to which he was called
upon to support the system by taxation." Id. at 609-10.
The Court in Wiesenjeld stated that although Social Security benefits are not
necessarily related directly to tax contributions, nonetheless,
[s]ince OASDI [Social Security Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance] bene-
fits do depend significantly upon the participation in the work force of a covered
employee, and since only covered employees and not others are required to pay
taxes toward the system, benefits must be distributed according to classifications
which do not without sufficient justification differentiate among covered cm-
ployees solely on the basis of sex.
420 U.S. at 647.
31. 420 U.S. at 646.
32. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
33. 420 U.S. at 648. The Court held in Kahn that a statute "reasonably designed
to further the state policy of cushioning the financial impact of spousal loss upon
the sex for which that loss imposes a disproportionately heavy burden" is valid
under the equal protection clause. 416 U.S. at 355.
34. 420 U.S. at 648 (emphasis added), citing Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628
(1974); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
35. Report of the Social Security Bd., H.R. Doc. No. 110, 76th Cong., Ist Sess. 7-8
(1939). See also Hearings on the Social Security Act Amendments of 1939 Before the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 61, 1217, 1269.70 (1939); H.R.
Rep. No. 728, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 36-37 (1939); Final Report of the Advisory Council
on Social Security 31 (1938).
36. 420 U.S. at 648-49.
37. Id: at 651.
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the classification could not be explained as an attempt to provide for
the special disadvantages of women, it was indistinguishable from the
classification invalidated in Fronttero and thus itself invalid.
Although explicit reference to Reed was notably absent through-
out the Court's opinion,38 its ruling is in effect an extension of the
Reed analysis. The classification was invalid because it lacked a fair and
substantial relation to the actual purpose of the legislation.
The decision in Wiesenfeld clearly reflects the Court's increasing
propensity to invigorate the "rational relationship" test for use in sex
discrimination cases.3 9 While the test was, to say the least, lax prior to
Reed, with that case the emphasis shifted from the mere rationality of
the relationship between the challenged classification and a govern-
mental objective to the sufficiency of that objective. Reed, Kahn, and
the more recent case of Schlesinger v. Ballard4o all turn on the suf-
ficiency of the proffered objective of the statute in question." With
the decisions culminating in Iliesenfeld, '- the Court has gone one step
further. No longer is mere demonstration of a rational relationship
between the classification and an indisputably legitimate governmental
objective sufficient. The statute will nonetheless fall if there is con-
vincing evidence that the proffered objective was not in fact that which
the legislators had in mind at the time of enactment.
38. Its only reference to Reed was in support of the genezal proposition that a
statute which provides dissimilar treatment for men and uoinen who are sinilarl%
situated violates the due process clause. Id. at 653.
39. Some observers have suggested that the Court has forinulated a new inter.
mediate test for the validity of sex-based classifications. Sec, e.g., Gunter, 'the
Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Re%. I (1972).
40. 419 U.S. 498 (1975). In Ballard, the Court was faced with a challenge to tlhe
Navy's "up or out" requirements for officers, codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 6382. &101
(1970). These requirements allow women line officers a longer period than men bc-
fore mandatory discharge for want of promotion. On the basis of Reed, the Court
upheld the requirements, explaining that Congress might reasonably ha~e believed
that, due to the restrictions on women officers' participation in combat and sea duty
(women cannot be assigned to aircraft combat missions or to sea duty other than on
hospital ships and transports, 10 U.S.C. § 6015 (1970)), women line officers hac lems
opportunity for promotion than do their male counterparts, and that a longer period
of tenure for women officers is, therefore, consistent with the goal of providing uoinen
officers with "fair and equitable career advancement programs." 419 U.S. at 508. Be-
cause the rationale asserted to justify the gender-based classification was, as such,
adequate, the distinction was permissible. See id. at 510.
41. Amelioration of the effects of past discrimination (see, e.g., Kahn .. Shcin,
416 U.S. 351 (1974)) and assurance of a flow of promotions commensurate with op-
portunity for promotion (see, e.g., Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975)) are
sufficient objectives. Administrative convenience is noL Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971).
42. See note 23 supra.
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Decisions Since Iiesenfeld.-In the wake of Wieseneld, other
gender-based distinctions contained in the Social Security Act have
been challenged. Sections 402(e)43 and 402(f)44 grant benefits to a surviv-
ing spouse based on the covered earnings of a deceased spouse, if such
benefits are greater than those to which the surviving spouse is entitled
on the basis of his or her own earnings. While a widow who meets
these qualifications is automatically eligible for the benefits, a widower
must first show that he was receiving greater than one-half of his sup-
port from his wife at the time of her death. Similarly, sections 402(b) 4i
43. 42 U.S.C. § 402(e) (1970, Supp. IV, 1974) provides in part:
(e) Widow's insurance benefits.
(1) The widow ... and every surviving divorced wifc . . . of an individual who
died a fully insured individual, if such widow or such surviving divorced wife-
(A) is not married,
(B)(i) has attained age 60, or (ii) has attained age 50 but has not attained age
60 and is under a disability . . .
(C)(i) has filed application for widow's insurance bcncfits, or was entitled to
wife's insurance benefits, on the basis of thc wagcs and self-employment income
of such individual, for thc month prcccding thc month in which he died, and
(I) has attained age 65 or (II) is not entitled to benefits under subscction (a)
of this section or section 423 of this title, or (ii) was entitled, on the basis of
such wages and sclf-cmploymcnt incomc, to mother's insurance benefits for the
month preccding the month in which she attained age 65, and
(D) is not entitled to old-agc insurancc benefits or is cntitled to old-agc in-
surance benefits each of which is less than the primary insurance amount of
such deceased individual,
shall be entitled to a widow's insurance benefits ....
44. 42 U.S.C. § 402(f) (1970) contains comparable provisions with respect to a
widower, with the additional rcquiremcnt that he
(D)(i) was receiving at least one-half of his support, as determined in accordance
with regulations prescribed by thc Secretary, from such individual at the time of
her death, or if such individual had a period of disability which did not end
prior to the month in which shc dicd, at thc time such pcriod began or at the
time of her death, and filed proof of such support . . . or (ii) was receiving at
least one-half of his support, as dctcrmincd in accordance with regulations
prescribed by thc Sccrctary, from such individual at the time she became entitled
to old-agc or disability insurance benefits or, if such individual had a pcriod of
disability which did not end prior to the month in which she becamc so entitled,
at thc time such period began or at the timc she became entitled to such bene-
fits, and filcd proof of such support ....
45. 42 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1970, Supp. IV, 1974) providcs in part:
(b) Wife's insurance bcncfits.
(1) The wife.. .and every divorccd wifc ... of an individual entitled to old.agc
or disability insurance bcnefits, if such wife or such divorced wife-
(A) has filed application for wife's insurancc benefits,
(B) has attained age 62 or (in thc casc of a wife) has in her carc (individually
or jointly with such individual) at thc tinc of filing such application a child
entitled to a child's insurance bcncfit on thc basis of the iwagcs and sclf.cmploy-
ment income of such individual,
(C) in the casc of a divorced wife, is not marricd, and
(D) is not entitled to old-age or disability insurance benefits, or is cntitlcd to
Imaged with the Pemission of N.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law
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and 402(c)46 require men seeking old-age benefits through their wives'
contributions to demonstrate greater than one-half dependence on their
wives' earnings. Courts have invalidated both of these distinctions in
recent months.
In Goldfarb v. Secretary of HEIT',4 7 the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York invalidated the requirement in
section 402(f)(1)(D) that widowers prove dependency to be eligible for
survivor's benefits. 48 Finding the case to be controlled by IWiesenfeld,
the court ruled that because there is no support for the proposition that
working women are less concerned about their spouses' welfare in old
age than are working men-a generalization upon which the court felt
the statute was necessarily premised-its application deprived women of
protection for their families which men received and was therefore
unconstitutional. 49
In addition, other district courts have invalidated the section 402
(c)(1)(C) dependency requirement for men seeking old-age benefits
through their wives' earnings,50 applying what may fairly be called an
invigorated version of the traditional rational relationship test.
In Silbowitz v. Secretaiy of HETV, 5' the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida found the statute to be like
those in Frontiero and IViesenfeld. 2 Applying Reed, the court held
old-age or disability insurance benefits based on a primary insurance amount
which is less than one-half of the primary insurance anount of such indihidual,
shall (subject to subsection (s) of this section) be entitled to a wifes ingurance
benefit ....
46. 42 U.S.C. § 402(c) (1970) contains comparable provisions with respect to
a husband, with the additional restriction that he
(C) was receiving at least one-half of his support, as determined in accordance
with regulations prescribed by the Secretary, from such individual-
(i) if she had a period of disability which did not end prior to the month in
which she became entitled to old-age or disability insurance benefits, at the be-
ginning of such period or at the time she became entitled to such benefits, or
(ii) if she did not have such a period of disability, at the time she became
entitled to such benefits ....
47. 396 F. Supp. 308 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (three-judge court) (per curiam), prob. juris.
noted sub nom. Matthews v. Goldfarb, 44 U.S.L.W. 3462 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1976) (No.
75-699).
48. Its broad-ranging decision also invalidated §§ 402(b), (c)(l)(C). and (c).
49. 396 F. Supp. at 309.
50. Silbowitz v. Secretary of HEW, 397 F. Supp. 862 (S.D. Fla. 1975), appeal filed
sub nom. Matthews v. Silbowitz, 44 U.S.L.W. 3319 (U.S. Nov. 13, 1975) (No. 75-712);
Jablon v. Secretary of HEW, 399 F. Supp. 118 (D. Md. 1975) (three-judge court). ap-
peal filed by plaintiff, 44 U.S.L.W. 3319 (U.S. Nov. 18, 1975) (No. 75.727). appeal
filed by defendant sub nom. Matthews v. Jablon, 44 U.S.L.W. 3319 (U.S. Nov. 19,
1975) (No. 75-739). But cf. Moss Y. Secretary of HEW, Civil No. 74-721-Civ-T-H (M.D.
Fla. Jan. 15, 1976); see notes 72-82, 105-15 infra and accompanying text.
51. 397 F. Supp. 862 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
52. Id. at 865-66.
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that, because the purpose of the statutory scheme was the protection of
family needs and because the dependency test resulted in the granting
of benefits to nondependent women while withholding them from no-
dependent men, the classification was not rationally related to the state
objective and was therefore invalid.Z3 It rejected the defendant's asser-
tion, based on the ruling in Geduldig v. Aiello,5' that the distinction
was consonant with the Social Security Act's intention to provide and
allocate fiscal resources to those with the greatest need. 5 The court
termed this reliance on Aiello "misplaced,"56 pointing out that since
economically independent wives receive benefits without regard to need,
the statute is obviously not intended to fulfill such an objective, and
that if preservation of fiscal resources were the concern, a more rational
statute would require a showing of dependency for both males and
females. 57
The court also rejected 5s the defendant's assertion that the classifica-
tion seeks to remedy the economic plight of women and therefore meets
the rationality test set forth in Kahn v. Shevin.59 It looked beyond the
proffered intent of the classification to find that its actual purpose was
administrative convenience and, citing Frontiero, held that such pur-
pose was an insufficient justification for the distinction. 60
The section 402(c)(1)(C) dependency requirement was also invali-
dated by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland in
Jablon v. Secretary of HEW.6' The Government there made several
arguments in defense of the statute. First, it contended once again that
Congress is not constitutionally required to provide similarly-situated
males and females with the same Social Security benefits due to the
"noncontractual" nature of these benefits. 02 This argument was dis-
missed with a reference to Wiesenfeld's discussion of Flemming v.
Nestor.6 3 A contention that the fact that women are more likely to need
53. Id. at 865-67.
54. 417 U.S. 48. (1974), where the Court held, inter alia, that the conservation and
allocation of fiscal reserves of the state's disability insurance program is a legitimate
state objective that may be achieved through the denial of pregnancy benefits,
which are necessarily limited to women.
55. 397 F. Supp. at 867.
56. Id. The court viewed plaintiff's claim as inherently different from that
asserted in Aiello because plaintiff, a covered worker, was denied a benefit a similarly-
situated woman would receive.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 870-71.
59. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
60. 397 F. Supp. at 867.
61. 399 F. Supp. 118 (D. Md. 1975).
62. Id. at 127.
63. Id. See note 30 supra.
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such benefits justifies the distinction was similarly rejected on the basis
of Wiesenfeld. 4 The Government then attempted to distinguish WIiesen-
feld on the basis that the presumption of nondependency on the part
of the male was irrebuttable in that case, whereas, under section 402
(c) (1)(C), a male applicant may receive benefits by demonstrating de-
pendency.65 The court rejected this defense and pointed out that, even
if the gender-based distinction of section 402(c)(1)(C) was less "per-
nicious" than that invalidated in ITiesenfeld, it was nonetheless virtually
identical with the scheme invalidated in Frontiro.60
The Government further argued that section 402(c)(1)(C) was
enacted as remedial legislation aimed at compensating women for past
discrimination and thus is supported by Kahn T7 Citing the JWiesenfeld
rule that the mere recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not
an automatic shield against inquiry into actual purposes," the court
pointed out that it had "not been referred to any legislative history
which suggests that that section had the broad remedial purpose the
Government seeks to ascribe to it" and found that no such purpose was
evident on the face of the statute.r-
Even assuming such a remedial purpose, the court continued, the
statute does not appear to be reasonably designed to further it, since
the earnings of those women who do work are, solely on the basis of
their sex, made less valuable to their families than the earnings of a
similarly-situated male.70 Applying WViesenfeld, tie court declared the
classification unconstitutional'i
In Moss v. Secretary of HEV,72 the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Florida also held the gender-based distinction in
qualifications for retirement benefits unconstitutional. Announcing that
it was applying the Reed standard,73 the court, rel)ing on Frontiero
and Wiesenfeld, found that "the only discernible justification for the
gender-based distinction in this instance is one of administrative con-
venience ... [which] is simply not enough to sustain it against an equal
protection challenge."7 4 In so holding, the court rather sketchily re-
64. 399 F. Supp. at 128.
65. Id. at 128-29.
66. Id. at 129.
67. Id. at 129-30.
68. 420 U.S. at 648.
69. 399 F. Supp. at 129-130.
70. Id. at 130.
71. Id. at 126.
72. Civil No. 74-721-Civ-T-H (M.D. Fla. Jan. 15, 1976).
73. Id. at 4.
74. Id. at 7.
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jected a number of government arguments.75 According to the district
court, each of these arguments rested on one of two fallacious premises:
that the challenged classification was overinclusive rather than under-
inclusive, and that the presumption of female dependency serves the
valid governmental objective of rectifying past discrimination against
women.' 0 The fallacy in these arguments, reasoned the court, is that
they concentrate only on the beneficiaries of derivative Social Security
benefits, rather than also examining the gender-based distinctions from
the perspective of wage earners. Examined this way, wrote the court, it
is clear that the presumption of female dependency operates to the
disadvantage of working wives in that their wages generate less pro-
tection for their families than do those of working husbands. 77 Given
this effect, the court found that the statutory scheme was underinclusive
with respect to female wage earners and, inasmuch as it discriminated
against them, could not be said to be designed to rectify past discrimina-
tion against women.78
In addition to the gender-based distinctions in the Social Security
Act which have already been invalidated, there are others which are also
susceptible to an equal protection challenge under the fifth amendment
due process clause. In particular, both sections 402(b) and 402(e), dis-
cussed above,7 9 have provisions which allow divorced wives to receive
benefits in certain circumstances, but sections 402(c) and '402(f) do not
provide parallel benefits for divorced husbandss 0 Furthermore, the
Railroad Retirement Act 8 ' has gender-based distinctions analogous to
those in the Social Security Act.8 2 It is likely that in the near future the
constitutionality of these provisions will be litigated and, on the basis
of Wiesenfeld, invalidated.
The Appropriate Parties.-Plaintiffs in several of these cases made
an effort to broaden the effect of the rulings in their suits by moving
to proceed as a class action. In Wiesenfeld, the plaintiff sought in the
district court to represent a class of "all widowers who have in their
care a child of an insured individual entitled to federal social security
child benefits and who are excluded from benefits for themselves solely
because they are men."8 3 During oral argument, however, he admitted
75. The opinion does not indicate precisely what these agiitnets wcc.
76. Civil No. 74-721-Civ-T-H at 6.
77. Id. at 6-7.
78. Id.
79. See notes 43, 45 supra.
80. See notes 44, 46 supra.
81. 45 U.S.C. § 228a (1970).
82. E.g., 45 U.S.C. § 228e(b) (1970) prolides annuitics to widows of partially in-
sured [as defined in § 228e(1)(8)] employees, but not to widowers of such employees.
83. 367 F. Supp. at 986.
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that the purpose of this request was merelh to safeguard the constitu-
tional attack against mootness.S4 The court held this reason insufficient
to maintain a class action and denied the motion. 5 The order was not
appealed8s Similarly, in Goldfarb the plaintiff moved for certification
as a class.8 7 The application was denied summarily with a citation to
Viesenfeld.ss
The plaintiffs in Jablon and Moss likewise attempted to proceed
as class actionsS9 An intervening Supreme Court decision, however,
caused them to withdraw their class requests.
That decision was Weinberger v. Salfi,9' decided on June 26, 1975.
The named plaintiffs, a widow and her child, were denied Social Security
benefits after the death of the widow's husband of less than six months,
on the basis of the duration-of-relationship requirements of the Social
Security Act. These define "widow" and "child" so as to exclude sur-
viving wives and children who had their respective relationships to a
deceased wage earner for less than nine months prior to his death.'" t
The plaintiffs sought to represent a class of all widows an( stepchildren
of deceased wage earners who are denied benefits because the wage
earner died within nine months of the marriage.' 2
The Supreme Court, in ruling that the motion for a class determi-
84. Id. The case could have become moot if. e.g.. Wiescnfeld remarried before
the final decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(g)(l)(A) (1970, Supp. IV. 1974), supra note 12.
85. 367 F. Supp. at 986-87. Determination of the propriety of a class action is
ordinarily a matter for the trial court's discretion. See, e.g.. Clark %. Watchie, 513 F.2d
994, 1000 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. C. 72 (1975); Foster v. Sparks, 506 F.!d 805.
808 (5th Cir. 1975). The recent case of Board of School Coninm'rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S.
128 (1975) (per curiam), however, casts doubt on the continuing %aliditv of the refusal
to certify the class on the ground expressed by the district court in il'esenfeld. Jacobs
holds that certification as a class action may be necessary to anoid :ootness and thus
strongly implies that this is a legitimate purpose for such certification. Id. at 129. Sec
also Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 402-03 (1975). But see footnotcs 90-96 infra and
accompanying text.
86. 420 U.S. at 641 n.9.
87. 396 F. Supp. at 309. The opinion does not indicate how the plaintiff defined
the purported class.
88. Id.
89. 399 F. Supp. at 123-24. The plaintiffs in Jablon proposed to represent
"all past, present and future husbands of old age benefits recipients 101o8
husbands are entitled to Social Security benefits" but for the dependency require.
ments of 42 U.S.C. § 402(c)(1)(C), and . . . "all past, present antd future rcipients
of old age benefits under the Social Security Act uihose husbands are entitled to
benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 402(c)" but for Lhe dependency requitencens of section1
402(c)(1)(C).
399 F. Supp. at 123-24. The opinion in Moss does not indicate how the plaintiffs de-
fined the purported class.
90. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
91. 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(c)(5), (2) (Supp. IV, 1974).
92. 422 U.S. at 755.
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nation should have been dismissed,9 raised a nearly insurmountable
barrier to future class actions sought to be maintained on chims arising
under the Social Security Act. It ruled that federal jurisdiction over
such suits derives solely from section 405(g) of the Act0 I and not from
28 U.S.C. § 1331,95 upon which the plaintiffs before it had proceeded.
One of the prerequisites for judicial review under section 4 05(g) is a
"final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to which [the
claimant] was a party." Inasmuch as the complaint did not allege that
the class members had filed applications with the Secretary, much less
received final decisions, the Court held that "the District Court was
without jurisdiction over so much of the complaint as concerns the
class." 90
The likely effect of the Salfi decision, as Jablon and Moss illustrate,
will be to reduce, if not entirely eliminate, the usefulness of class action
suits regarding Social Security. As such, it denies the fruits of challenges
to those who are in all probability least likely to receive them any other
way. Since the rulings in the lower court decisions under discussion apply
only to the individual litigants involved, it is unclear whether each
person seeking relief from the discriminatory provisions of the Social
Security Act will be required to initiate suit on his own behalf. t -
93. Id. at 764.
94. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1970) provides in part:
Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearitg to
which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a
review of such decision by a civil action .... Such action shall be brought in tile
district court of the United States for the judicial district in which the plaintiff
resides, or has his principal place of business .... As part of his answer the
Secretary shall file a certified copy of the transcript of the record including the
evidence upon which the findings and decision complained of are based. The
court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record,
a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Secretary, with
or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.
95. The Court said that the third sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (1970), providing
that
[n]o action against the United States, the Secretary, or any other officer or cut-
ployee thereof shall be brought under section 41 [the previous codification of
§ 1331] of Title 28 to recover on any claim arising under this subchapter [Title
II of the Social Security Act]
does not merely codify the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies but bars § 1331 jurisdic-
tion altogether. 422 U.S. at 757-61.
96. 422 U.S. at 764.
97. These cases are currently being appealed to the Supreme Court. Should the
Court hear these appeals, the Social Security Administration will clearly abide by the
Court's decision. If the Court does not hear the appeals, however, letting the lower
court decisions stand, it is possible that the Social Security Administration will only
distribute benefits in response to specific court orders. Telephone conversation with
Kathleen Peratis, staff attorney with the American Civil Liberties Union, Jan. 29, 1976.
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The Appropriate Remedy.-In 1Wiesenfeld, the statute which was
declared unconstitutional 98 provided benefits for certain women but not
for similarly-situated men. Theoretically, it could have been remedied
by either eliminating the benefit altogether or by extending it to men.
The Court gave the relief requested by the plaintiff-extension of the
benefits to men. Although neither the Supreme Court nor the district
court gave any justification for this choice, it appears to be consonant
with the legislative purpose of the statute as interpreted by the Supreme
Court.9 9
In the cases involving dependency requirements, 0o a benefit was
available to both men and women, but was available to a broader class
of women than men. The courts, having declared these statutory schemes
unconstitutional, once again had the same two remedies available-
either expanding the class of eligible men to equal that of women, or
narrowing the class of eligible women to match that of men.
Three of the courts chose to expand the class of men eligible for
benefits, although the Jablon court was the only one to articulate its
reason. Its decision was based primarily on the factor of cost.'0' Upon
a showing that elimination of the support requirement for males would
cost about $411 million per year,10 2 while the cost of administering the
dependency requirements for both sexes could be as high as one billion
dollars, 03 it ordered the Social Security Act to be interpreted and en-
forced without reference to such dependency requirements.10 4
The court in Moss, on the other hand, indicated that the class of
eligible women should be narrowed to match that of men. 0 5 Its anal)sis
was based on the view that "the Court must choose the alternative that
Congress would have selected had it confronted the question."'1o There-
upon, the court embarked on an analysis of the legislative history of
derivative Social Security benefits.
Derivative benefits, the court noted, were added to the Social
Security benefit structure in recognition of the fact that the adverse
98. 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1970).
99. See notes 35-37 supra and accompanying text.
100. Goldfarb, Silbowitz, Jablon, and Moss.
101. 399 F. Supp. at 131-33.
102. Id. at 132.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 132-33. The court noted also that this uas the remedy given in the
similar situation of Frontiero.
105. It is important to note, as did the court, that § 405(g) (see notes 91-116 suLpra
and accompanying text) limits the jurisdiction of the court to "affirming. nodihfing.
or reversing the decision of the Secretary." Civil No. 74-721-Ci%-T-H at 7. Thus, the
effectuation of the court's holding as to the constitutional remedy is limited to af-
firming the decision of the Secretary. Id. at 14-15.
106. Id. at 9.
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effects of a worker's loss of earning capacity might not be limited to the
worker.' 07 Since, the court reasoned, "one person's loss of earning
capacity would adversely affect the economic welfare of another only if
the latter were dependent upon the former," it inferred a congressional
intent to bestow derivative benefits only on dependentslO s The court
was not swayed from this conclusion by the fact that section 102(b) does
not require wives to have been dependent in order to receive derivative
benefits. Rather, the court pointed out, the statute originally required
dependency of a sort.109 That requirement was eliminated not to
"divorce derivative benefits from . .. dependency,"'1 0 but, rather, to
facilitate administration of the benefits by creating a presumption of
wives' dependency upon their husbands."' 1 On this basis, the court
concluded that reimposition of the dependency requirement for wives
would more likely match congressional intentt.1 12
To bolster its choice of remedy, the court observed that the Social
Security Act was passed pursuant to article I, section 8 of the Constitu-
tion,113 empowering Congress to expend funds for the general welfare.
Judicial enlargement of the coverage of the Act, necessitating an in-
crease in government expenditures,'" 4 would, the court reasoned, "im-
pinge" upon the doctrine of separation of powers.11
107. Id. at 10.
108. Id. at 11.
109. Id. The original § 402(b) (Act of Aug. 10, 1939, ch. 666, § 202(b), 53 Stat.
1364) required a woman to be "living with" her husband to qualify for benefits. Sec-
tion 409(n) (Act of Aug. 10, 1939, ch. 666, § 209(n), 53 Stat. 1378) stated that a woilan
was living with her husband if "they are both members of the same household, or
she is receiving contributions from him toward her support, or he has been ordered
by any court to contribute to her support." To buttress its interpretation, the Mol
court cited similar interpretations by congressional committees. See Hearings on Social
Security Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. of Ways and Means, 83d Cong., It
Sess. 69 (1953); S. Rep. No. 1669, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1950).
110. Civil No. 74-721-Civ-T-H at 11.
111. Id. at 11-12. "Benefits are provided for a wife or widow without a test for
support because it is reasonable to presume that a wife or widow loses support, ol a
potential source of support, when the husband's earnings are cut off." H.R. Doc. No.
80, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1971).
112. Civil No. 74-721-Civ-T-H at 12-13.
113. Article I, § 8 provides in part that "[tjhc Congress shall have 'ower To ...
provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States."
114. The court distinguished potential expenditures necessary for administration
of the dependency requirement from expenditures for benefits which would be
mandated by elimination of the dependency requirement on the grounds that the
former "would not entail the type of 'spending' contemplated by Article 1, Section
8." Civil No. 74-721-Civ-T-H at 13-14.
115. Id. at 13. This reasoning, although perhaps appealing on its face, is not as
persuasive in other contexts. For example, it is not at all clear that a court faced with
a racially discriminatory benefit scheme would be forced to eliminate tile benefit
altogether rather than extend it to the group wrongfully excluded.
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In sum, the plaintiffs in Moss won the battle but lost the war. The
court found the difference in requirements for men and women un-
constitutional, but concluded that the proper remedy was extension of
the stricter men's requirements to women. Thus, the Secretary's order
was affirmed, and the plaintiff, concededly unable to meet this test, lost
the case.
The ultimate effect of the decisions in tile lower court cases follow-
ing Wiesenfeld will likely be found in amendments to the Social
Security Act which they may spark. A study group of the Senate Special
Committee on Aging, which is at present examining gender-based
distinctions in Social Security benefits, has recommended following the
cases and dropping the dependency requirements altogether. 10 In
testimony before the committee, however, Social Security Commissioner
James B. Caldwell differed with this view. He pointed out that elimina-
tion of the dependency requirement could cost $450 million and that
many of the men benefitted would be government workers with earn-
ings not covered by Social Security and a few independently wealth
men.117 Thus, he concluded, elimination of the dependlncy require-
ment would constitute a "windfall that should, if at all possible, be
avoided." ' s He indicated that the preferable course would be to elim-
inate the windfall which has alwa)s existed for wonien i t ' and implied
that dependency requirements should apply to both sexes.
Whether or not the case law gives rise to legislative amendments, its
effect is significant. These decisions represent one more step in the
gradual process of assuring equal treatment for men and women. As a
result of this litigation, the earnings of men and women will provide
the same protection for their families under the Social Security Act.
II
PREGNANCY DISABILITY BENEFITS
Introduction.-During the past year, three decisions by federal courts
of appeals 20 have held that private employer disability compensation
116. N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1975, at 18, cols. 1-3.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975). aWg 375 F. Supp.
367 (E.D. Va. 1974), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 36 (1975) (No. 74-1589); Commnunications
Workers of America v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1975). rcv'g
379 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 368- (U.S. June
19, 1975) (No. 74-1601); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975).
aff'g 372 F. Supp. 1146 (W.D. Pa. 1974). cert. granted, 421 U.S. 987 (1975) (No. 74-1245).
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plans which deny benefits for pregnancy or pregnancy-relatcd dis-
abilities violate title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196411 and the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's EEOC guidelines prom-
ulgated thereunder. 22 Title VII and the EEOC guidelines represent
a potent new avenue of attack against sex discrimination by private
employers, necessitated by the Supreme Court's reluctance to hold that
disparate treatment of pregnancy-related disabilities is sex discrimina-
tion in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.
Geduldig v. Aiello,1 23 decided in 1974, marked a retreat from the
Court's stronger stand in earlier sex discrimination casCs. 1 2 In an
See also Holthaus v. Compton & Sons, 514 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1975) (reversing the
judgment of the lower court and ruling that discharge of anit employee because of
pregnancy-related disability in disregard of the policy extended towards other teln-
porary disabilities was discrimination in violation of title VII); bit see Newimon v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 238 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (holding that Delta Air Lines'
denial of disability pay and sick leave pay to pregnant women did not violate title
VII, because pregnancy is a voluntary and normal condition that does not meet the
definition of sickness or disability).
121. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.2(a) (1970),
provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis.
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of emplo)ument op).
portunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
122. The guidelines issucd by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1975), provide:
(a) A written or unwritten employment policy or practice which excludes from
employment applicants or employees because of pregnancy is in prima facie viola-
tion of title VII.
(b) Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion, child.
birth, and recovery therefrom are, for all job-related purposes, temporary dis-
abilities and should be treated as such under any health or temporary disability
insurance or sick leave plan available in connection with employment. Writtent
and unwritten employment policies and practices involving matters such as the
commencement and duration of leave, the availability of extensions, the accrual
of seniority and other benefits and privileges, reinstatement and payment under
any health or temporary disability insurance or sick leave plan, formal or in-
formal, shall be applied to disability due to pregnancy or childbirth on the same
terms and conditions as they are applied to other temporary disabilities.
(c) Where the termination of an employee who is temporarily disabled is caused
by an employment policy under which insufficient or no leave is available, such
a termination violates the Act if it has a disparate impact on employees of one
sex and is not justified by business necessity.
123. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
124. In 1973, four of the Supreme Court justices were persuaded that sex, like
race and national origin, is an inherently suspect classification under the equal pro-
tection clause. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). When Cleveland Bd.
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opinion delivered by Justice Stewart, A iello held that the provisions of
California's public disability insurance program'2" which exclude from
coverage disabilities arising from normal pregnancy and childbirth do
not constitute invidious discrimination in violation of the equal protec-
tion clause.' 20 The Court found that the state had a legitiniate financial
interest in maintaining the program on a self-supporting basis, in sus-
taining benefit payments at an adequate level, and in keeping the em-
ployee contribution rate low.1 2 7 Characterizing the California program
as a social welfare program to compensate disabled workers, the Court
reasoned that the legislature could constitutionally seek to reiedy the
problem on a step-by-step basis; California had sinupl) chosen to legislate
on aspects other than pregnancy.12 8 Justice Stewart noted that, "[p]ar-
ticularly with respect to social welfare programs, so long as the line
drawn by the State is rationally supportable, the courts will not interpose
their judgment as to the appropriate stopping point."' -"'
Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall dissented, adhering to the
position that gender is an inherently suspect classification and must
therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny1a 0 They found that the
state's interest in cost control was not sufficient to justify the discrimina-
tory practice, especially when sexually neutral means were available to
reduce costs.' 3'
of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), which held that a school teacher cannot be
forced to stop teaching after five months of pregnancy, was decided soleiv on due
process grounds, however, without mention of equal protection, it bec~aine ckar that
the majority of the Court was not prepared to hold that sex was a suspct class. Set-
Turner v. Department of Employment Security. 96 S. Ct. 249 (1975). which followed
LaFleur's due process reasoning to invalidate a provision of Utah law dislualif(ing
pregnant women from unemploniment compensation for a period extending front 12
weeks prior to the expected date of birth through six weeks after childbirth.
125. Cal. Unep. Ins. Code §§ 2601-3272 (West 1972). California's disability in-
surance system, in effect for almost thirty %ears, was designed to complemtent the
state's workmen's compensation and umemplo mnent insurance programs by providing
payments to private emplo)ees who are temporarily unable to work bcattse of dis-
ability not covered by workmen's compensation. See California Comnpensation Isis. Co.
v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 128 Cal. App. 797, 276 11.2d 1.18 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954).
The program is funded entirely from contributions deducted fron the 1%agt' of
participating emploees. Each employee contributes V, of his salary up to all annual
maximum of $90. Cal. Unep. Ins. Code § 985 (West Supp. 1975). Depending upoln the
amount earned during the base period, an emploce is eligible to rceihe benefits
varying from $25 to S119 per week, id. § 2655, foi a maximum period of 26 ueks. Id.
§ 2653. Disabilities suffered in connection with a normal pregnantcv aic excltded front
coverage. Id. §§ 2626, 2626.2. The program now pro% ides benefits for abnornalities and
complications arising from pregnancies. Id.
126. 417 U.S. at 494.
127. Id. at 496.
128. Id. at 495.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 503.
131. Id. at 503-04.
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Although the challenge in Aiello was based on the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment rather than on title VII and the
EEOC guidelines, Aiello has been put forth as an obstacle to upholding
the EEOC guidelines and invalidating private employer disability plans
which deny pregnancy benefits. This section of the article analyzes the
three most recent appellate cases which upheld tile EEOC guidelines.
Distinguishing Aiello.-In all three circuit court cases, the de-
fendant-employers contended that Aiello broadly held that disparate
treatment of pregnancy in disability compensation plans is not sex dis-
crimination. Each court distinguished Aiello and found sex discrimina-
tion to be present.
In Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,13 2 two female employees
brought a class action on behalf of all female employees of Liberty
Mutual Insurance Company, alleging, inter alia, that the company's
"income protection plan"'133 violated title VII. In this case of first
impression, the Third Circuit articulated the argument upon which
other cases have principally relied in distinguishing Aiello. The court
pointed out that Aiello involved constitutional analysis whereas the
issue in Wetzel turned on the interpretation of title VII.13 4 Implicit in
this distinction is the recognition that the requirements of the equal
protection clause for state legislation may be less restrictive than Con-
gress's statutory requirements enacted pursuant to that clause for private
employers. 135
Although holding that, "[o]n this distinction alone we believe ap-
pellant's reliance on Aiello is misplaced,"'130 the Third Circuit also
relied on the difference in coverage between California's and Liberty
Mutual's disability programs.1 3 The state disability plan involved in
Aiello excluded only normal pregnancy from eligibility, while the pro-
gram under review in Wetzel excluded all pregnancy-related disabilities,
132. 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 421 U.S. 987 (1975) (No. 74-1215).
133. Liberty Mutual's income protection plan was partially funded through cim-
ployce contributions. After an eight-day absence due to illness, an employee received a
percentage of his salary. 511 F.2d at 203.
134. Id. Compare Seaman v. Spring Lake Park Independent School Dist., 387 F.
Supp. 1168 (D. Minn. 1974) (holding that denial of sick leave pay, pursuant to a
provision in a collective bargaining agreement, to an employee on maternity leave dh(
not violate equal protection) with Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 382
(E.D. Va. 1974) ("[t]hc rights assured by Title VII are not rights which caln be bar-
gained away-either by a union, by an employer, or by both acting in concert," quoting
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1971)).
135. For another recent example of this type of analysis, see Evidence, 197,1/75
Ann. Survey Am. L. 333, which discusses the holding of the Supreme Court that certain
wiretapping which would be permitted by the fourth amendment was forbidden undter
title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-
20 (1970).
136. 511 F.2d at 203.
137. Id.
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including conditions which would be regarded as disabilities in non-
pregnant persons, but which were excluded simply because they occurred
in connection with pregnancy.l 3s
The differences in coverage of the disability plans considered in
Aiello and Vetzel are significant and might have warranted the same
result in Wetzel even if the defendants had succeeded in convincing
the court that Aiello should control the interpretation of title VII.
Aiello involved a plan which compensated pregnancy-related disabilities
and omitted from coverage only normal pregnancy expenses. It is ques-
tionable whether that decision would have been the same had the plan
excluded pregnancy-related disabilities which would have been com-
pensated in the absence of pregnancy. Thus, Wetzel's second ground
for distinguishing Aiello provides substantial support for the Third
Circuit's holding.
The Second Circuit's consideration of Aiello in Commnunications
Workers of America v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.130 achieved
Wetzel's result but through a significantly different procedural route.
Aiello was decided while the case was still in the discovery stage and
prompted the district court to dismiss the complaint sua sponte and
certify the question to the Second Circuit.4 0
The district court placed primary emphasis on footnote 20 to
Justice Stewart's opinion in Aiello, which states:
The California insurance program does not exclude anyone from
benefit eligibility because of gender but merely removes one physical
condition-pregnancy-from the list of compensable disabilities.
While it is true that only women can become pregnant, it does not
follow that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a
sex-based classification .... Absent a showing that distinctions in-
volving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious
discrimination against the members of one sex or the other, law-
makers are constitutionally free to include or exclude pregnancy
from the coverage of legislation such as this on any reasonable
basis, just as with respect to any other physical condition."14
138. Id.
139. 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3684 (US. June
19, 1975) (No. 74-1601).
140. 379 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The district court consolidated the Com-
munications Workers case with Women in City Govt United v. City of New York.
which charged that a health and hospitalization plan gihing fewer benefits for
pregnancy-related conditions than for other medical problems iiolated both the equal
protection clause and title VII. The W'omnen United case was also dismissed by the
district court and is presently on appeal.
141. 417 U.S. at 496 n.20. Justice Stewart pointed out that California's disability
insurance program excluded not only disabilities attributable to normal pregnancies
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According to the district court in Comnmnunications Vorkers, this
language provides "the key to the Court's decision [in Aiello]. It flatly
states that distinctions involving pregnancy do not constitute discrimina-
tion because of sex (or gender)."'' 4 2 Under this view, the denial of
pregnancy benefits in a disability compensation program is not invalid
under either the equal protection clause or title VII unless it is a mere
pretext to effect an invidious discrimination against women.
The Second Circuit gave short shrift to the district court's analysis
and framed the issue more narrowly. The question for decision was
whether Aiello mandated dismissal of the complaint for failure to state
a claim on which relief could be granted under title VII.143 The court
answered the question in the negative. To underscore its disagreement
with the district court's reliance on footnote 20,144 the court cited nearly
a dozen cases in support of its admonition against reading too much into
"marginalia" of Supreme Court opinions not directly applicable to the
facts at bar. According to the appellate court, footnote 20, properly
viewed, is restricted to the validity of legislative classifications under
the equal protection clause.14 3 It was intended to refute the argument
of the dissent in Aiello that greater judicial scrutiny should be applied
to California's plan.
Like the court in Wetzel, the Second Circuit emphasized that Aiello
was constitutionally rather than statutorily based.140 The court noted
that the Supreme Court made no mention of title VII or the EEOC
guidelines in Aiello, which strongly suggested to the circuit court that
the decision in Aiello was not intended to affect them.147 The court
observed in a footnote that Justice Stewart must have had the guidelines
in mind, since he had called attention to them only five months earlier
in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur.4 8
but also any disability of less than 8 days unless the employee is hospitalized, Cal.
Unep. Ins. Code §§ 2627(b), 2802; all disabilities after 26 wecks, id. § 2653; and dis.
abilities resulting from civil commitment as a dipsomaniac, drug addict, or sexual
psychopath, id. § 2678. 417 U.S. at 488.
142. 379 F. Supp. at 681.
143. 513 F.2d at 1027.
144. Id. at 1028.
145. Id. at 1030.
146. Id. at 1031.
147. Id. at 1030.
148. Id. n.11. In referring to the 1972 amendment to title VII extending its
coverage to state agencies ani educational institutions, Justice Stewart observed:
[T]he Equal Employment Opportunity Commission promulgatdt guidelines pro-
iiding that a mandatory leave or termination policy for pregnant 1%omcn
presumptively violates Title VII..... While the statutory anendmeuts and the
administrative regulations are, of course, inapplicable to the cases now before us,
they will affect like suits in the future.
414 U.S. at 639 n.8.
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In Gilbert v. General Electric Co.,141 a class action similar to 11'etzel,
the Fourth Circuit not only distinguished Aiello by citing I'eizel and
Communications IVorkers, 13o but introduced an additional interpre-
tation of its own. The Gilbert opinion emphasized that cases arising
under the equal protection clause and those arising under title VII
involve the application of two different standards in determining
whether sex discrimination exists.' 5 ' Under the equal protection clause,
there need be only a rationally supportable basis to uphold a legislative
classification.' 2 Thus, the court observed, while the Supreme Court
considered the disparate treatment involved in Aiello to be discrimina-
tory, it was not invidiously discriminatory, since it had "a rational
relationship to the objective of the legislature in establishing the social
welfare program under review." 1 3 Title VII, on the other hand, does
not authorize a rationality test for determining discrimination nor does
it require that the discrimination be "invilious."1 54 Rather, the statute
prohibits any and all sex discrimination in conditions of enplo)Ient.1"5
The only exception to title Vii's mandate concerns a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification that is reasonably necessary to the normal operation
of the particular business, 150 a defense not raised by the emplo)er in
Gilbert.15,
Judge Widener dissented in Gilbert, believing that Aiello was con-
trolling15s He argued that even if title VII had a broader reach than
the equal protection clause, it would not invalidate the pregnancy ex-
clusion at issue, absent a showing of sex discrimination.1 59 "Since Ehe
Supreme Court has held, for precisely the same exclusion, there is a
'lack of identity between the excluded disability and gender as such,'
the exclusion should no more support a finding of discrimination under
Title VII than under the equal protection clause," he asserted. 16'1 Judge
Widener's argument on this point cannot be ignored. Unless there are
two different standards for determining the existence of sex discriniina-
tion (as opposed to the applicable legal standard once discrimination is
found), then a finding by the Supreme Court of no discrimination in a
comparable plan seems to be decisive here.
149. 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975).
150. Id. at 666.
151. Id.
152. 417 U.S. at 495.
153. 519 F.2d at 666-67.
154. Id. at 667.
155. Id.
156. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1970).
157. 519 F.2d at 667.
158. Id. at 668.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 668-69.
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The majority attempted to refute the dissent's argument by main-
taining that the Supreme Court did in fact find discrimination (but not
invidious discrimination) in the California plan in Aiello.10 1 Given the
language of footnote 20 of the Aiello opinion, however, the Fourth
Circuit's conclusion, though heroic, is not entirely persuasive. 02
Judge Widener argued further that Aiello was not decided in a
"vacuum" but looked forward to title VII cases that were certain to
follow.' 6 3 Since the statute was neither involved nor mentioned in
Aiello, this assumption is questionable. The more reasonable assump-
tion, proffered by the court in Communications Workers, is that Justice
Stewart, aware of the EEOC guidelines from his opinion in LaFleur,
would not have intended to affect them sub silentio.104
Judge Widener's dissenting opinion asserted that Fourth Circuit
precedent requires title VII to be interpreted by the same standards
applicable to the equal protection clause.1' 6 Thus, if the California plan
considered in A iello was valid under the equal protection clause, then
General Electric's plan must be valid under title VII. Judge Widener
based his contention on United States v. Chesterfield County School'
District.0 6 A cursory reading of this case shows that his reliance was
misplaced. Chesterfield was a suit under the equal protection clause by
black teachers allegedly fired because of racial discrimination. The
school district had instituted a policy of dismissing teachers who scored
below a certain level on a national standardized test. The fired teachers,
who had scored below that level,6 7 alleged that the classification was
discriminatory under the Supreme Court's holding in Griggs v. Dukc'
Power Co.,1 68 which prohibited "an employment practice which operates
to exclude Negroes [if it] cannot be shown to be related to job per-
formance."169
The holding of Chesterfield was merely that the test of validity
developed under title VII is also the proper test under the equal pro-
tection clause.' 7 0 Judge Widener's attempt to bootstrap this into a
general holding that title VII is in all cases congruent with the equal
protection clause is clearly overextrapolation. It would render title VII
a meaningless reiteration of the Constitution. The Second Circuit's
161. See note 153 supra and accompanying text.
162. See note 141 supra and accompanying text.
163. 519 F.2d at 669.
164. See note 148 supra and accompanying text.
165. 519 F.2d at 669.
166. 484 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1973).
167. Id. at 71-73.
168. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
169. Id. at 431.
170. 484 F.2d at 73.
Imaged with the Pemission of N.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law
SEX DISCRIMINATION
admonition to the district court in Comnmnunicalions WI'orkcrs concerning
Aiello's footnote 20 applies with full force here.1 '
Judge Widener's opinion does reveal an overlooked, anomalous b)-
product of the title VII attack on sex discrimination. Judge Widener
pointed out that, under Aicllo, a state disability program for private
employees would be free to deny benefits for pregnancy, but, under title
VII, a state's program for its own employees would not.'-2 He found
this inconsistency unjustified and would interpret title NII to eliminate
it.173 While the anomaly is clear, to pervert congressional intention in
order to preserve consistency in the law seems unjustified in this con-
text. If California's legislature may, consistent with the equal protection
clause, tackle only parts of a problem, Congress should be afforded the
same luxury.
Validity of the EEOC Guidelines.-After deciding that Aiello is
no bar to suits under title VII, the Gilbert and lVetzel cases considered
whether the guidelines promulgated by the EEOC1 -1 properly interpret
the statute.' 75 Both courts agreed that statutory construction by the
EEOC, although not having the force of law and not binding on a
federal court, is entitled to great deference if the administrative guide-
lines and their application are faithful to the legislative purpose.' -
The more extended discussion occurred in Wi'etzel, where the court
was urged by Liberty Mutual to reject the EEOC guidelines as incon-
sistent with the policy of the act.1 77 The defendant relied on Espinoza
v. Farah Manufacturing Co.,17s where EEOC guidelines relating to dis-
crimination based on national origin had been invalidated as incon-
sistent with congressional intent.'79 In Espinoza, the Supreme Court
decided that discrimination based on national origin did not encompass
discrimination against noncitizens, as the EEOC guidelines had provided.
The court in Wetzel, however, properly discerned no overstepping of
congressional bounds by the EEOC guidelines concerning pregnancy
disability. It found that such guidelines furthered the legislative pur-
171. See text accompanying notes 144-45 supra.
172. 519 F.2d at 669.
173. Id.
174. See note 122 supra.
175. 519 F.2d at 663; 511 F.2d at 204-05. Although the Second Circuit in Com-
munications Workers did not decide whether the EEOC guidelines correctly inter-
preted title VII, it observed that the guidelines were *entitled to 'great deference'
unless their application would be inconsistent with an obvious Congressional intent."
513 F.2d at 1030 (footnotes omitted).
176. 519 F.2d at 664 & n.12, citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971);
511 F.2d at 204.
177. 511 F.2d at 205.
178. 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
179. Id. at 94-95.
Imaged with the Pemission of N.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law
1976 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW
pose of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which is to strike at a broad
spectrum of discriminatory practices, and that the gttidelines were coll-
sistent with the plain meaning of the statute.'8 0
The employers in Wetzel further argued that the present guidelines
concerning pregnancy disability, issued in 1972, are inconsistent with
the EEOC's earlier position and, therefore, the denial of pregnancy bene.
fits does not violate title VII.181 The Third Circuit recognized the
EEOC's ability to update its promulgations to adapt to society's chang-
ing attitudes and referred to the Espinoza Court's statement that the
most recently issued guideline is the one entitled to greatest deference.18s2
The court noted that "this evolutionary process is a necessary function
of our legal system," which must remain flexible and adaptable to
society's maturation. s3
Gilbert considered the issue of whether discrimination in fringe
benefits was outlawed by title VII.181 General Electric contended that
fringe benefits were not properly within title VII's proscription of dis-
crimination "with respect to .. . compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment."' 5s
In rejecting this argument, the court relied upon the broad re-
medial purpose of title VII, which is "plainly spelt out in the act.""'
Title VII is aimed at eliminating discriminatory treatment in employ-
ment decisions extending beyond discrimination in wage rates, the court
observed. It pointed out that the EEOC guidelines, which "are merely
expressive of what is the obvious meaning and purpose of the Act,"18 7
explicitly include fringe benefits within the scope of title VII.ass Tie
court noted, in addition, that General Electric was in no position to
claim this exclusion since it stated in its annual report that "compensa-
180. 511 F.2d at 205.
181. Id.
182. Id. See 414 U.S. at 94.
183. 511 F.2d at 205.
184. 519 F.2d at 663-64. The fringe benefit at issue was General Electric's cln-
ployce disability plan.
185. See note 121 supra for text of 42 U.S.C. § 2000C-2(a)(l) (1970). See also
Bernstein & Williams, Title VII and the Problems of Sex Classification in Pension
Programs, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 1203, 1214 (1974).
186. 519 F.2d at 663.
187. Id.
188. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9 (1975) provides in part:
(a) "Fringe Benefits," as used herein include medical, hospital, accident, life in-
surance and retirement benefits; profit-sharing and bonus plans; leave; and other
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. (b) It shall be an unlawful em-
ployment practice for an employer to discriminate between men and women with
regard to fringe benefits.
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tion at General Electric is interpreted broadll to include not onl\ ione-
tary returns but also the value of benefit programs."I'",
Employers' Policy A rgumen ts.-In .1 iello, Justice Stewart wrote that
California's state disability plan, which excludes pregnancy from bene-
fit eligibility, divides potential recipients not into women and men, but
into two groups, pregnant wonen and nonrljegnant person.'"O Betause
the second group included members of both sexes, e~Cn though the filst
was exclusively female, Justice Stewart was apparently satisfied that the
classification was not sex-based1 '1 In contrast, the circuit court ill
Gilbert, taking its cue from the Aiello dissent, stressed that pregnauiN
is a condition peculiar to women, that it is ineitably sex-linked, and
that to single out a physical condition unique to women for less fiaor-
able treatment in an inclusive disabilit) insurance plan is discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex."9 ' '
The employers in Gilbert and Wetzel attempted to distinguish
pregnancy from other disabilities by claiming that pregnlanc% is not a
"sickness" because it is "voluntary." 3 Neither court was receptive to
these arguments.
Wetzel found pregnancy to be a "sickness" because it has esenitiall)
the same effects as any temporary disability.)" The court pointed out
that pregnant employees suffer the same economic burdens and loss of
income' 95 as any temporarily disabled eniplo)ee. It concluded that
pregnancy is no different than an) other temporary disability under
an income protection plan offered to help emplo)ees through the
financially difficult times caused by illness."'10 Since Liberty Mutual's
plan covered almost all temporary disabilities but pregnancy, the plan
discriminated against women and was therefore invalid.117
Gilbert relied on prior authority to reach the same result. After
finding that neither "sickness" nor "disability" was defined by the Gen-
189. 519 F.2d at 664.
190. 417 U.S. at 496-97 n.20.
191. Id.
192. 519 F.2d at 664. The court in Wetzel did not specificallv attack the Aiello
Court's finding that the classification was not sex-based. It found Aiello distinguish-
able because it concerned a question of constitutional rather than statutory inter-
pretation. See notes 134-35 supra and accompanying text.
193. 519 F.2d at 664-65; 511 F.2d at 206.
194. 511 F.2d at 206.
195. Id. In Gilbert, one of the plaintiffs worked until five weeks before the birth
of her child. Because she was ineligible for disability benefits and had no alternati~c
sources of income, the gas and electricity wcre cut off in her home and site was
unable to provide adequately for her newborn child. 375 F. Supp. at 381 n.12.
196. 511 F.2d at 206.
197. Id.
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eral Electric plan, the court looked to case law. 19 8 Although several
cases construing insurance contracts had excluded pregnancy from the
definiti6n of "sickness,"' 0 9 the court chose to rely on W'etzel and a line
of labor arbitrations200 which equated pregnancy with other disabili-
ties. 201
The employers also contended that because pregnancy is "volun.
tary," whereas other disabilities are not, it may be excluded from
employer disability plans.2 02 This argument fared no better than the
first. Wetzel found voluntariness no justification for disparate treatment.
The court reasoned that disability resulting from many voluntary
activities, such as drinking intoxicating beverages, smoking, skiing, and
playing handball or tennis, is covered under Liberty Mutual's plan.10U
Thus, even if pregnancy is "voluntary," there is no excuse for excluding
it, since other voluntary disabilities are covered.2 0 ' In fact, the court
added, for a variety of reasons, including religious convictions or failure
of contraception methods, pregnancy may not always be voluntary.2 05
The General Electric plan at issue in Gilbert was also found to
cover other "voluntary" disabilities. For example, the plan provides
benefits for disabilities arising from cosmetic surgery and attempted
suicides.206 Thus, the court found, "[w]hatever facile plausibility there
might be to the argument that its plan does not cover 'voluntary' dis-
abilities accordingly disappears in the face of the manner in which the
defendant itself has construed and applied its plan."2 07
Employers have additionally argued that maintaining the financial
integrity of their disability plans justifies exclusion of pregnancy bene-
fits. Substantially increased cost to its sickness and accident plan was
the reason given for GE's original refusal to grant maternity benefits.208
Liberty Mutual argued that its disability plan does not violate title VII,
because of the company's legitimate interest in maintaining the financial
198. 519 F.2d at 665.
199. The court cited Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n v. United Cas. Co.,
142 F.2d 390 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 729 (19414); Price v. State Capital Life
Ins. Co., 261 N.C. 152, 134 S.E.2d 171 (1964). 519 F.2d at 665 n.13.
200. Middletown Bd. of Educ., 56 Lab. Arb. 830 (1971); Republic Steel Corp., 37
Lab. Arb. 367 (1961); National Lead Co., 18 Lab. Arb. 528 (1952).
201. 519 F.2d at 665 & n.14.
202. Id. at 665; 511 F.2d at 206.
203. 511 F.2d at 206.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. 519 F.2d at 665; 375 F. Supp. at 381.
207. 519 F.2d at 665.
208. 375 F. Supp. at 378.
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integrity of the plan.20 9 Cost is no defense, however, to a charge of sex
discrimination under title VII.210 Sexually neutral means are available
for reducing costs, such as setting a maximum amount for any single
disability. As the district court opinion in Gilbert pointed out, the issue
involves not the amount paid but rather the discriminatory distribution
of available funds.2 11
The district court in Gilbert also rejected a defense of business
necessity,2 12 the only valid defense under the EEOC guidelines. General
Electric attempted to justify its exclusion of pregnancy.related disabili-
ties by showing that its practice was one of business necessity, in that the
prohibitive cost of including pregnancy-related disabilities would destroy
the company's entire disability program. The court in Gilbert found
that the cost projection analysis submitted by the company was merely
speculative as to actual future costs. 2 1 3 Similarly, the Third Circuit in
Wetzel found that the increased cost for inclusion of pregnancy in
Liberty Mutual's insurance plan would not be "devastating" to the
fiscal integrity of the program.2 14
General Electric also argued that exclusion of pregnancy disability
benefits is necessary in order to prevent the disproportionate allocation
of funds between men and women employees. - 15 The company submitted
data in Gilbert showing that women utilize the sickness and accident
plan more frequently than men and, General Electric argued, the in-
209. 511 F.2d at 206.
210. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(e) (1975) provides: -It shall not be a defense under Title
VII to a charge of sex discrimination in benefits that the cost of such benefits is
greater with respect to one sex than the other."
211. 375 F. Supp. at 382.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 379. General Electric also argued that pregnant Iuolnlt would submit
unduly large claims because they are incapable of working for long periods of timc
during pregnancy and childbirth. Id. at 378. The district court found, hiow vcr. that.
absent complications, there appeared to be no medical reason win pregnant wonicu
cannot work up to the time of childbirth; it obscrvcd that man women cannot affoid
prolonged absences from work after childbirth. Id. at 377. The company further
contended that pregnancy should be excluded because it icquircd long absences front
work. The court dismissed this argument, noting that lung cancer. major surger) and
broken limbs generally occasion long periods of convalesceice, Net ac not excluded
on that account. Id. at 374.
General Electric's concern that the disability piograui iouIld be abused bli ionitn
who might continue to claim benefits after they had full% recoicrcd from childbirth
and were capable of resuming employment was similarly dismissed by the district
court. Id. at 378. Since claimants arc required to submit inedical certification of the
date of termination of the actual disability and pregnancy-related conditions arc
medically verifiable, the danger of fraud was found to be no greater here than for
other included disabilities. Id.
214. 511 F.2d at 206.
215. 375 F. Supp. at 379.
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clusion of pregnancy benefits would increase this imbalance. 1 o The
district court found this argument equally unconvincing.2 17
The so-called business considerations discussed above which were
offered by General Electric and the other employers do not meet the
criteria of business necessities nor do they constitute a bona fide oc-
cupational qualification under the EEOC guidelines. The EEOC guide-
lines21 8 mandate that the bona fide occupational qualification exception
be interpreted narrowly219 and specifically reject as justifiable business
exceptions the refusal to hire a woman on the "assumption that the
turnover rate among women is higher than among men." 22 0 The guide-
lines require that a woman be evaluated on the basis of her individual
capabilities and not on stereotyped generalizations attributed to her
sex.2 2 1 The only situation which the Commission considers to be a bona
fide occupational qualification is "[w]here it is necessary for the purpose
of authenticity or genuineness," as in the case of the hiring of an actor
or actress to fill a certain part.2
2 2
What will hopefully be the definitive ruling on the issue is expected
imminently from the Supreme Court, which has granted certiorari and
heard arguments in lVetzel and Gilbert.22 3
216. Id. at 377-79.
217. The court pointed out that no study had been made of the cost of conpcnsat-
ing for disabilities having an exclusive or higher incidence in men, such as vascctomies
or heart attacks. Id. at 383. Moreover, there was no showing that the cost of pregnancy
coverage would be substantially greater than the cost to the program of other specific
disabilities, such as heart attacks. The court even suggested that if payment of dis-
ability benefits for pregnancy did provide a greater economic advantage to women,
this was simply an acknowledgment of womcn's "biologically more burdensome" role
in procreation. Id.
The district court also rejected General Electric's claim that, since a large per.
centage of women do not return to work after childbirth, payment of disability
benefits would be equivalent to giving women tcrmination pay not available to non.
pregnant employees. Id. at 379. The court observed that termination pay is received
by all workers who fail to return to work following illness or accident. Id.
218. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (1975).
219. Id. § 1604.2(a).
220. Id. § 1604.2(a)(I)(i).
221. Id. § 1604.2(a)(1)(ii).
222. Id. § 1604.2(2). In Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 5,12 (1971),
there was no showing that sex was a bona-fidc occupational qualification nectissary
for the position of "assembly trainec" to justify a hiring policy that discriminated
against women with preschool age children.
223. The two cases wcrc consolidated by the Supremc Court. Sec 44 U.S.L.W. 31421
(U.S. Jan. 27, 1975) for a summary of thc argumcnts presented. The General Electric
case affects more than 100,000 cmployccs and could involve millions of dollars in
benefits accruing sincc 1971. N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1975, at 36, col. 3.
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III
TITLE IX
Introduction.-In the early 1970's, the women's movement sought to
codify and expand courtroom victories in the area of sex discrimination
in education. In response to this thrust, Congress enacted title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972,221 which, with certain important ex-
ceptions, prohibits sex discrimination in "any education program or
activity receiving federal funds."22 This portion of the article explore,
the scope and application of title IX in the context of certain con-
troversial areas which will be affected by its mandate.
Although cast in the form of a general prohibition, title IX in-
cludes numerous important exceptions to the basic rule. With respect
to admissions to educational institutions, for example, its prohibition
of sex discrimination is limited to vocational and professional programs,
public institutions of undergraduate higher education other than those
which traditionally and continually from their establishment have had
a policy of admitting only students of one sex, and all institutions of
graduate higher education.22 6 Single sex institutions in the proces of
224. Act of June 23, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, §§ 901-03. 907, 86 Stia. 373
(codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-86 (Supp. IV, 1974)). § 906, 86 Stat. 375. amending 29
U.S.C. §§ 203(r)(1), (s)(4), 213(a) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c(b), 20OOc-6(a1)2 ). 200tc-9, 2000h.
2 (Supp. IV, 1974).
225. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (Supp. IV, 1974). Title IX also ptohibits disciiininatiou
against the blind in educational institutions or programs receiving federal flunds. Id.
§ 1684. Its enactment was the culmination of a two-year legislatihe process. First. in
1970, the House Special Subcommittee on Education held hearings on discrimination
against women. Hearings on § 805 of H.R. 16098 Before the Special Subconmm. on
Educ. of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 91st Cong.. 2d Sess. (1970). -11
emphasis of these hearings was limited female emploinent opportunity. with a focus
on employment in higher education. As all outgrowth of the hearing, a general
prohibition against sex discrimination in higher education institutims rcci ing federal
funds was included in the general higher education appropriations bill of 1971. H.R.
16098, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). The bill, howeer, died in committee. E. Green,
Foreword to Discrimination Against Women at IX (C. Stimpson ed. 1973). In 1971,
House hearings were held on all onnibus higher education bill which inchded a bait
on sex discrimination. Hearings on H.R. 7248 Before the Subcomm. oil Educ. of the
House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 92d Cong.. 1st Sess. (1971). Again. little attention
in the hearings was deooted to student-oriented problems in areas such as admissions.
athletics, or financial aid. The bill, H.R. 7248, 92d Cong.. 1st Sess. (1971). uhich was
limited to higher education, was passed in the House on Nov. 5. 1971. 117 Cong. Rec.
39354 (1971). The Senate counterpart, S. 659, which had been passed on Aug. 6. 1971.
id. 30500, extended the ban on sex discrimination to all institutions of iocational,
professional, or higher education receiving federal funds. The Conference Conmnitc
adopted the Senate's broader approach. Senate Conf. Rep. No. 92-798, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 221 (1972).
226. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681(a)(1), (5) (Supp. IV, 1974).
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changing to a coeducational system were given six years to comply.22 7
Institutions exempted from the admissions provision include private and
public preschool, elementary and secondary institutions, private under-
graduate colleges, and public, traditionally single sex undergraduate
colleges.22 8 Institutions exempted from admissions provisions are, how-
ever, still subject to title IX prohibitions in other respects. 229
Title IX completely exempts from all provisions institutions whose
primary purpose is the training of members of the United States mili-
tary services,2 30 as well as institutions controlled by religious organiza-
tions where enforcement would be inconsistent with the religious be-
liefs of such organizations.2 31 As amended in 1974,232 title 1X also
provides complete exemption for social fraternities and sororities, and
for the YMCA, YWCA, Girl Scouts, Boy Scouts and other tax-exempt
youth groups which have traditionally been limited to persons of one
sex.2 3 3 In response to the concerns of more conservative members of the
House of Representatives, title IX specifically states that the general
prohibition does not require preferential treatment to redress existing
sexual imbalances.2 4 Moreover, the law specifically permits the main-
tenance of separate housing facilities for each sex.2 5
Title IX provides no guidance as to what forms of discrimination
are prohibited, but only empowers each federal department and agency
227. Id. § 1681(a)(2) provides in part:
In regard to admissions to educational institutions, this section shall not apply
(A) . . . for six years [after the date of enactment], in the case of an educational
institution which has begun the process of changing from being an institution
which admits only students of one sex to being an institution which admits
students of both sexes, but only if it is carrying out a plan for such a change
which is approved by the Commissioner of Education or (B) for seven years from
the date an educational institution begins the process of changing from being
an institution which admits only students of one sex to being an institution which
admits students of both sexes, but only if it is carrying out a plan for such it
change which is approved by the Commissioner of Education, whichever is litter.
228. Id. §§ 1681(a)(1), (5). A traditionally single sex institution is defined as one
which traditionally and continuously since its establishment has had a policy of ad.
mitting members of only one sex.
229. The limitations of §§ 1681(a)(1), (2), and (5) apply only to admissions.
230. Id. § 1681(a)(4).
231. Id. § 1681(a)(3).
232. Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-568, § 3(a), 88 Stat. 1862.
233. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(6) (Supp. IV, 1974).
234. Id. § 1681(b). Nine Republican Congressmen, in an "additional view" to the
report of the Education and Labor Committee, had urged the addition of the language
contained in § 1681(b). H.R. Rep. No. 554, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 251-53 (1971). It should
be noted, however, that § 1681(b) specifically does not preclude the use of statistical
evidence showing sexual imbalance as to services, benefits, or activities in determining
whether sex discrimination exists.
235. 20 U.S.C. § 1686 (Supp. IV, 1974).
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which extends funds to educational programs to "effectuate the pro-
visions" of title IX.236
These governmental entities are authorized to issue rules or regula-
tions to be effective upon presidential approval " 37 and to cut off federal
funds for specific programs as to which there has been an express find-
ing, after opportunity for a hearing, of noncompliance. 23 Fund termina-
tion, or refusal to grant or continue funds, is permitted, however, onl
where it has been determined that compliance cannot be secured by
voluntary means.2 39 Finally, title IX provides for judicial review of de-
partmental actions, specifically authorizing review of fund termination
and actions in which an agency has refused to grant funding due to
noncompliance. 40
Although title IX was enacted on June 23, 1972,4' 1t its actual im-
plementation required the promulgation of agency regulations. The
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW\), which has
the greatest responsibility for the federal funding of educational pro-
grams,242 did not publish proposed regulations until June 20, 1974,213
almost two full years after the enactment of title IX."4 4 The final
regulations, implemented by the HEW Office for Civil Rights (OCR),
became effective on July 21, 1975.243
236. Id. § 1682.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. Before termination of funds, the agency must inforin the congresional
committees with jurisdiction oier the educational program in questiolt of the circuim-
stances of and grounds for fund termination. The fund termination takes effeCt 30
days after the filing of such report. Id.
240. Id. § 1683.
241. Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 374 (1972).
242. HEW has funding authority for 16,000 public school mstcms and alnost
2,700 postsecondary institutions. Press Release by Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretan of
HEW, June 3, 1975, at I.
243. 39 Fed. Reg. 22228 (1974).
244. Already concerned about the limitations placed by Congress on the law's
basic mandate, feminist organizations and their congressional supporters %ic* cd HEW's
slow pace as a case of bureaucratic footdragging. Ann Scott. Vice President for Legisla-
tion, Higher Education Task Force of the National Organization for Women (NOW).
viewed the agency's delay in issuing regulations *[a)s a further instance of unconcern."
Hearings on S. 2518 Before the Subcomm. on Educ. of the Senate Comn. on Labor
and Pub. Welfare, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 73 (1973). Peter Holmes, Director of the Office
for Civil Rights (OCR) of HEW, in a letter to Senator Walter Mondale. Chairman of
the Senate Subcommittee, responding to criticism by the Senator of the delay. stated
that "[t]o define in clear and specific terms the obligations conferred by Title IX in
areas such as athletics and the whole spectrum of employment rights, in elementary
and secondary as well as higher education, has not been a simple undertaking." Id. at
231. Holmes continued, '[t]o be sure, we are dealing with complex and sensitive
issues." Id. at 235.
245. 45 C.F.R. § 86.1 (1975).
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While title IX's general format gave HEW substantial flexibility,
it also required the agency to establish policies frequently at odds with
the social and economic interests of significant sectors of society. The
nature and legitimacy of the most controversial of these policies are
examined below.
Athletics.-The most controversial area affected by title IX and the
HEW regulations is interscholastic athletic programs. Even before the
passage of title IX, female athletes had begun successfully to challenge
on equal protection grounds long-standing sex barriers to their full
participation in interscholastic athletics.
In Brenden v. Independent School District,24 0 one of the first cases
to deal with this problem, two outstanding female high school athletes
sought to enjoin enforcement of the Minnesota State High School
League rule which prohibited girls from participating in the boys'
interscholastic athletic program. 2 47 Desiring to participate in noncontact
sports for which their schools provided only male teams, the plaintiffs
asserted that the rule violated their rights under the equal protection
clause.2
4 8
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit agreed. Applying the
invigorated rational relationship test articulated in Reed v. Reed 40
the court held that the failure of the rule to consider the plaintiffs'
individual merits rendered it unconstitutional as applied to these plain-
tiffs.2 ° In granting the injunction, however, the Eighth Circuit em-
phasized that the case did not require consideration of whether separate
but equal facilities would violate the equal protection clause or whCther
exclusion of females is justified in contact sports.2 t
In a more recent case, Fortin v. Darlington Little League, Inc.,2"2
246. 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973), aff'g 342 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Milm. 1972).
247. 477 F.2d at 1294.
248. Id.
249. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See discussion at note 4 supra.
250. 477 F.2d at 1302. See also Gilpin v. State High School Activities Ass'n, Inc.,
377 F. Supp. 1233 (D. Kan. 1973), another suit brought not under title IX but kinder
the equal protection clause. In Gilpin, the plaintiff sought injunctive relief fron
enforcement of a state interscholastic rule, similar to that at issue in Brenden, pro-
hibiting mixed athletic competition. Id. at 1236. The interscholastic athletic associa.
tion argued that without a mixed competition bar girls would be rcquircd to com-
pete against superior male athletes and would lose much of the benefit to be gained
from individual competitive achievement. The association further contended that
abolition of the rule would jeopardize the state's athletic programs for girls. Id. at
1242. In granting the injunction, the court held that, although the state's purported
goal of advancing female athletics was laudable, the means employed (a total bar on
mixed competition) was overbroad and a violation of equal protection. Id. at 1213.
Although a mandatory sex separation rule might not be discriminatory where
equivalent programs for each sex were provided, such requirement was discrimilia tory
in the instant case where no female team was provided.
251. 477 F.2d at 1295.
252. 514 F.2d 344 (1st Cir. 1975).
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a father and his ten-year-old daughter sought injunctive and declaratory
relief against the denial of the daughter's right to participate in Little
League baseball.2 3 The), asserted that denying her the same places of
public accommodation and recreational activities that boys enjoyed
violated equal protection.2 4 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,
citing Schlesinger v. Ballard,255 asserted that the classification was a
denial of equal protection unless it could be shown to rest "oni a
convincing factual rationale going beyond 'archaic and overbroad gen-
eralizations' about different roles of men and women.' ' '5
The Little League offered the testimony of a physician experienced
in treating sports injuries but unfamiliar with female athletes who
asserted that girls were more susceptible to injury than boys.2-'  This
evidence was rebutted by expert testimony introduced by the plaintif."-
Given the conflicting evidence, the court refused to accept the view
that girls of the age group in question were more injury-prone than
boys.2 9 Furthermore, citing II'einberger v,. TViesenfcld, -'131 the court
stated that even if such a conclusion was "'not entirely without cm-
pirical support,' it represents the sort of 'gender-based generaliiations
[which] cannot suffice to justifD ' the categorical exclusion of girlb.' ' '
The court held that the denial of participation to all girls consti-
tuted an unconstitutional denial of equal protection.-""-' It qualified the
sweep of its holding, however, in noting that "[n]othing we sa is meant
to preclude recognition of bona fide distinguishing factors between the
sexes in some sports at some ages and in some circumstances. ' 1-3 None-
theless, Fortin can be read to place a heavy burden on those seeking to
exclude on the basis of sex. They will not be able to rel% on what may
seem to be common sense generalizations, nor will the% have a chatne of
prevailing unless they can produce strong empirical evilence to support
their positions.26 4
Efforts to enjoin enforcement of mixed competition rules have been
253. Id. at 345-46.
254. Id. at 346.
255. 419 U.S. 498 (1973). See discussion at note 40 supia.
256. 514 F.2d at 348, quoting 419 U.S. at 508.
257. 514 F.2d at 349.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 350-51.
260. 420 U.S. 636 (1973). See discussion at notes 23-39 Supia and accompanying text.
261. 514 F.2d at 350 n.5, quoting 420 U.S. at 643. The court noted pareaatheticallk
that the Little League accepted boss of all ph~sical conditions, ext'n the handicapped.
514 F.2d at 350.
262. 514 F.2d at 351.
263. Id.
264. Other cases in which state rules barring nixed interscholastic coinpctition in
a nonconact sport were enjoined on equal protection grounds include Morris %. State
Bd. of Educ., 472 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1973); Reed v. School Actiities s1, 311 F.
Supp. 258 (D. Neb. 1972).
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less successful where separate programs are provided for the sexes. In
Bucha v. High School Association,265 two female high school students
brought a class action to enjoin the enforcement of a statewide inter-
scholastic regulation barring girls from interscholastic swimming com-
petition.2 6 After the institution of the action, the state athletic as-
sociation amended its bylaws to permit girls' teams in interscholastic
swimming, but placed certain restrictions on the girls' teams that were
inapplicable to their male counterparts. 2 67 Plaintiffs challenged, on
equal protection grounds, the validity of the restrictions, the general bar
on mixed competition, and what they considered to be the less competi-
tive nature of the female team.
2 6 s
The court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, re-
jecting the equal protection claim. Applying the Reed rational relation-
ship test,2 69 it concluded that the physical and psychological differences
between the sexes could justify separate programs and different rules. -7 "
It conceded, however, that had Congress or the state legislature enacted
a law in education analogous to title VII in employment (such as title
IX), it might have found the different levels of competition invalid and
granted the injunction.2 71
In Darrin v. Gould,27 the Supreme Court of Washington suggested
that exclusion on the basis of sex from participation in contact sports
may violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Two high school girls, denied the right to participate on the boys' foot-
ball team due to a mixed competition bar,2 73 instituted a class action in
state court seeking an injunction against enforcement of the rule. The
girls had passed the required physical tests and were found eligible to
play by the school football coach.27'
The lower court denied relief, finding the rules reasonable as ap-
plied to females as a class on the ground that females were moi
susceptible to injury275 than males.2 - The Supreme Court of Washing-
265. 351 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. 111. 1972).
266. Id. at 71.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. See note 4 supra.
270. 351 F. Supp. at 74-75.
271. Id. at 75. Other cases in which rules barring mixed competition have been
upheld include Ritacco v. School Dist., 361 F. Supp. 930 (W.D. Ila. 1973) (separate but
equal programs for each sex where rational are valid).
272. 85 Wash. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975).
273. Id. at 861, 540 P.2d at 884.
274. Id.
275. Civil No. 63556 (Wash. Super. Ct. Oct. 9, 1973) at 4-6. The court did not
argue that the weaker "physical structure" of girls supported a total ban oi female
participation in football; rather, the court suggested that this factor supported the
prohibition against mixed football competition. Id. at 6.
276. Id. at 8. The court implied that the decision might improperly deny the
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ton reversed. Noting that both bo)s and girls risk phsikal injur% in
contact sports such as football,2 7 tile court concluded that members of
both sexes are entitled to a determination of eligibility based oi their
individual qualifications. 278 In treating girls differentl\ fromi boss, the
court concluded that the rules prohibiting mixed competition violated
the equal rights provision of the state constitution,"- .11 "if not the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'-','(
The HEW title IX regulations in the area of atiletics-% contain a
general prohibition against sex discrimination in interscholastic, inter-
collegiate, club, and intramural athletics.2,S" That general ban is quali-
fied by a subsequent provision which permits the operation of separate
teams on the basis of sex where "selection for such teams is based upon
competitive skill or the activity involved is a contact sport."213 In
effect, the regulations allow separate teams in all contact sports'h * as
well as in the overwhelming majority of noncontact sports on the in.
girls who brought the action proper access to tile bmo%" football team. The court
noted, however, that as a result of the nature of a class action. tile cout %%as "not
being asked to carve out an exception in the law to benefit tlice paiticular girls ii,
their circumstances." Id. The court therefoic concluded that "tile rights of tile Dattini
girls must be balanced against the collectihe rights of all high school girls." Id.
277. 85 Wash. 2d at 876, 540 P.2d at 892.
278. Id. at 867, 540 P.2d at 887. Citing Cleeland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414
U.S. 632 (1974), the court noted that under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment participants are entitled to '*an indixidualized determination of their
qualifications, not a determination based on the qualifications of a majorit% of tile
broader class of which the individual is a member." 85 Wash. 2d at 867. 510 1'.2d at
887. Despite its view that the rules barring mixed competition pic ,eut d snit de-
terminations for girls, the court did not find a due process iolation.
279. Wash. Const. art. 31, § 1, states: "Equality of rights and responsibilit under
the law shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex.-
280. 85 Wash. 2d at 877, 540 P.2d at 893. In finding the bar oi mixled compcti.
tion a violation of the equal rights amendment to the state constitution, the court
found support in an analogous Pennsylvania state court case. Id. at 872-74, 540 P.2d
at 890-91. In Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n. 33-1 A2d
839 (Pa. 1975), the court held that rules barring mixed competition enforced by the
state interscholastic athletic association violated the equal rights amendment to the
state constitution. Id. at 841. It did not consider whether the rules violated the four-
teenth amendment of the United States Constitution. Although the court did not
suggest that classification by sex could be made in contact sports, it did recognize
that an individual girl's weak physical condition or susceptibility to injury might be
a proper basis of exclusion. Id. at 843. In granting the injunction, the court upheld
the right of qualified females to take part on the boys' team, even where a girl's team
was provided.
281. 45 C.F.R. § 86A1 (1975).
282. Id. § 86.41(a).
283. Id. § 86A(b).
284. "Contact sports" are defined to include "boxing. wrestling, rugby. ice hockey,
football, basketball, and other sports the purpose or major actiiity of which includes
bodily contact." Id. It is interesting to note, by comparison, that the New York State
regulations which permit mixed competition in interscholastic nollcontact sports in-
clude among a listing of contact sports baseball, soccer, team handball, and %olleball.
8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 135.4(c) (1974).
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terscholastic, intercollegiate, and club levels, since team selection is gen-
erally based on "competitive" skill. Only on the intramural level, where
individual skill plays a lesser role in selection of participants, might
separate teams be held discriminatory in noncontact sports.
Where a team in a noncontact sport is operated only for one sex and
no corresponding team is offered for the other sex, the regulations re-
quire that members of the excluded sex be given an opportunity to try
out for the teamA8s In this respect the regulations codify the narrow
holding of Brenden.286 In addition, the regulations require the pro-
vision of equal athletic opportunity for members of both sexes by in-
stitutions which run or sponsor interscholastic, intercollegiate, club, or
intramural athletics.2 87 A list of factors relevant to a determination of
whether equal opportunity exists is specifically provided in the rcgtll-
tions.2 s While they do not require equal aggregate expenditures for
members of both sexes, they do provide that the failure to make adequate
funding available to members or teams of one sex may be a factor in
the Department's determination of equal opportunity.2 8
The HEW athletic regulations have created a storm of controversy.
The uproar, not surprisingly, has centered on the economic implications
of the equal opportunity provision, with the most intense opposition
emanating from the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA).
Its efforts have been directed, to date unsuccessfully, towards the adop-
tion of an exemption for "revenue-producing" sports from regulation
under title IX.290 Basic to the NCAA opposition is its fear of indiscrim-
285. 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(b) (1975).
286. 477 F.2d at 1295, 1302. See discussion at notes 246-51 supra and accolupan)iflg
text.
287. 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(c) (1975).
288. Id. They include but are not limited to the following:
(1) Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition effectively accom-
modate the interests and abilities of members of both sexes;
(2) The provision of equipment and supplies;
(3) Scheduling of games and practice time;
(4) Travel and per diem allowance;
(5) Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring;
(6) Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors;
(7) Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities;
(8) Provision of medical and training facilities and services;
(9) Provision of housing and dining facilities and services;
(10) Publicity.
289. Id.
290. Senator Tower introduced an amendment to the Education Amendments of
1974 that would have exempted all revenue-producing sports from title IX enforce-
ment. 120 Cong. Rec. S8488 (daily ed. May 20, 1974). The Conference Committee,
however, deleted the Tower Amendment. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1026, 3 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 4271 (1974). Included instead was the Javits Amendment, mandating
prompt HEW publication of proposed reglilations which would "include with respect
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inate use of the aggregate income factor."-'- HENV, through the regula.
tions as well as various public statements, has stressed that parit% of
expenditures is not a requirement but rather onIN one of seer:tl factors
to be considered in the determination of equal oppottnitufi).-' Neer-
theless, it is conceivable that enforcement of the equal opportunit)
provision may, at least where resources are scarce, require mnoflies to be
diverted from men's athletic programs to those for woien.- 3
Prior to the publication of proposedl regulations, OCR initiated a
complaint alleging a " 'large scale pattern of discrimination against
female athletes' at the University of Minnesota. - t4 The oinplaint,
which was filed jointly with the Twin Cities Student Assembly, alleged
that women made up forty-two percent of the universitN s student body
but received less than one percent of the intercollegiate sports budgCt.- ' 5
Two days after the publication of HEW's proposed title IX guide-
lines, the school increased the women's budget by more than 3001'o. t2tI
Furthermore, it was reported that an effort was begun to pressure the
state legislature to provide S700,000 for the university's sports progran,
to intercollegiate athletic activities reasonable provisions considering the nature of
particular sports." Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 844, 88 Star. 484 (1974). In Jull 1975, the
House Education and Labor Committee defeated all effort by Congrcsnaai Jamc
O'Hara, Post-Secondary Education Subcommittee Chairman. to ainend title IX b%
exempting revenue-producing sports. N.Y. Times, July 10. 1975, at 32, col. 4. Presidtnt
Ford, however, informed the chairmen of the congressional committees dealing with
title IX that he would welcome hearings on the issue of exempting revente producing
sports. The Senate Subcommittee on Education held hearings in Septenber 1975 on
the Tower Amendment. Senator Tower and Dr. John Fuzak. President of the NC.\A.
stressed that title IX regulation would result in reduced reecntis from reccnue-
producing sports, leaving less money to spend on other sports activities, including
women's sports. N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1975, at 51, col. 3.
291. Dr. William E. Davis, President of Idaho State U'iihetnit%, noted at the 1975
NCAA convention that "about $300 million was spent oit inteicollegiate atletics bN
all NCAA members last year. Can -ou imagine them getting up a total of $300 nmillion
more?" N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1975, at 39, col. 3. One of the three goals of the NC\ \
conention was reported to be preventing title IX **from becoming a *threat to entire
athletic programs.' " Id. at 37, col. 1.
292. "The Regulations do not demand dollar-for-dollar matching expenditures for
each sex." Press Release of Caspar W. Weinberger. Secretary of HEW, Jte 3, 1975. at
4. "Clearly, it is possible for equalit of opportuuitN to be prosidcd %ithout exact
equality of expenditure." 40 Fed. Reg. 24135 (1975).
293. See, for example, the comments of Chailot Cta dfoi. toach of the mn's
basketball team at Queens College, in anl article ingizig inens coaches atdt athletic
directors to cooperate with title IX: "Under current econoijc condition,, little or no
new re'enue will be a~ailable. With women getting a greater share of those un-
expanding resources, men's programs will be asked to stand still hile the wonten
attempt the long-distance run to equality." Crawford, Title IX: No Reason for Fright.
N.Y. Times, Aug. 10, 1975, § 5, at 2, col..t.
294. Wehrein, Universitv of Minnesota Reacts, I WonieWls L. Rep. 1_21 (Special
Educ. Supp. Sept. 15, 1974).
295. Id.
296. Id.
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to be divided equally between men and women. 207 The university's
response was probably based on the tougher requirements in the pro-
posed regulations29 since deleted in the final rules-most notably the
affirmative action provisions.299 It is doubtful that the university would
have responded as rapidly under the more complex and less aggressive
final regulations.
Subsequent to the passage of title IX and adoption of the HEW
regulations, and perhaps in response to them, the state of California
enacted a statute requiring that athletic programs operated by the state's
colleges, publicly financed community colleges, and universities "be
provided on as equal a basis as is practicable to male and female
students."3 00 The law further provides that "[t]he costs of providing
these equal opportunities may vary according to the type of sports con-
tained within the respective men's and women's athletic progratns.'a 1ol
Finally, it states that "[a]dditional sources of revenue should be de-
termined to provide additional funds for these equal opportunity pro-
grams." 302 The statute is thus a conservative one: it permits the con-
tinuation of discriminatory practices if it would be impracticable to
change them; it sets tp a varying standard of equal opportunity; and it
provides that the costs of redressing unequal opportunity should be
absorbed only by new sources of revenue. Presumably, if the governing
authority determines that no new funds are available for athletics, the
failure of a college to provide a women's basketball team could not be
redressed from the existing sports budget.
In contrast to the narrow scope of the California statute, New
Jersey has recently enacted a general ban against sex discrimination in
the public schools which has been broadly interpreted in relation to
athletics. 303 Since that statute's adoption, the state interscholastic athletic
297. Id.
298. 39 Fed. Reg. 22236 (1974).
299. The proposed regulations required recipients to make affirinative efforts
with regard to members of a sex for which athletic opportunities previously have
been limited . . . to: (1) Inform members of such sex of the mailability for then
of athletic opportunities equal to those aiailable for members of the other sex
and of the nature of those opportunities, and (2) Provide support andtl training
actisitics for members of such sex designed to iiprove and expand their capabili-
ties and interests to participate in such opportunities.
39 Fed. Reg. 22236 (1974). Furthermore, the proposed regulations required recipients
to "make affirinatie efforts to proiide athletic opportu nities in such sports and
thiough such tcanis as will most effectivcly equalizc such opportunities for inteibets
of both sexes." Id.
300. Cal. Educ. Code § 22504.7 (West Supp. 1975).
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A: 36-20 (Supp. 1975). "No pupil in a public school
in this state shall be discriminated against in admission to, or in obtaining ally ad.
vantages, privileges or courses of study of the school by reason of . . sex."
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association has amended its regulations to require, if sufficient female
interest is demonstrated, the provision of a girls' team, even in contact
sports, equivalent in equipment and coaching to the boys' team. 30 4 The
new rules further provide that, if no separate team is available for girls
due to lack of interest, they be allowed to try out for the bo)s' team.305
Text books.-While admitting that the problem of sex stereotyping
in textbooks is a serious one,30G HEW, in its final regulations, specifically
exempted textbook and curricular materials from regulation under title
IX.307 It justified the exemption on the ground that proper stauttory
interpretation prohibits the extension of regulation into constitutionally
sensitive areas, absent a specific mandate to the contrary. 0 6 Fearing that
textbook regulation would turn the Department into a federal censor
and would raise first amendment freedom of expression problems"t
and finding no legislative history concerning textbooks, HEWV opted for
nonregulation.31 0
Even if HEW were to elaborate on the nature of the first amend-
ment problems raised by textbook regulation3 l' and more rationally
explain its posture, such a course would not surmount what appears to
be the real roadblock to HEV action-the controversial political issues
inherent in textbook regulation.
In announcing the final regulations, Caspar Veinberger, the HEW
Secretary, commented that it would be "wholly inappropriate" for the
federal government to regulate the content of textbooks and that the
304. Karen Cristiano, a New Jersc) high school student, wanted to compete on
the school fencing team in 1973. At the time, mixled interscholastic competition was
permitted in noncontact sports. An amateur fencing group, howeelr, conminccd the
state interscholastic athletic association that fencing was reallh a contact sport. As a
result, Karen was dropped from the team. She subscquently led a lobb,,ing light for
the passage of the nondiscrimination statute cited in note 303 supra. After its passage.
Karen began a legal action to oerturn the NJSIAA regulations. Reportcdli, the
Association decided to change its regulations to permit mixed competition ill contact
sports only after receiving legal advice that such a change uas required by the new
statute. N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1974, at 33, col. 1, -10, col. 3.
305. N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1974, at 40, col. 3.
306. 40 Fed. Reg. 24135 (1975).
307. 45 C.F.R. § 86.42 (1975). "Nothing in this regulation shall be interpreted as
requiring or prohibiting or abridging in any way the use of particular textbooks or
curricular materials." For a discussion of the nature and effects of sex stcreot)ping in
textbooks, see Note, Sex Discrimination: The Textbook Case. 62 Calif. L. Rev. 1312.
1314-24 (1974).
308. 40 Fed. Reg. 24135 (1975).
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Regulation of the use of sexually biased textbooks in federally funded
schools would not preclude the publication of such materials. Admittedly. marketplace
economics would discourage the publication of a textbook that is likely to be banned
from federally funded schools due to sexist content. Yet there is no authority to sup-
port a view that the right to publish profitably is protected by the first amendment.
See Note, Sex Discrimination: The Textbook Case, supra note 307, at 1329.
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issue was "more properly dealt with at the state and local level."' ' 12
Implicit in that statement is the view, not without merit, that state and
local governments are better equipped than the federal government to
resolve highly charged, socially divisive issues and that a multiplicity
of local standards is preferable to one federal rule.
As yet, only one state, California, has enacted specific legislation
prohibiting school board adoption of textbooks containing "matter
reflecting adversely" upon persons due to their sex.3 13 The statute re-
quires that educational materials adopted by school boards accurately
portray "[t]he contributions of both men and women in all types of
roles, including professional, vocational, and executive roles.'1 14
The enforcement of these far-reaching provisions, however, has been
less than vigorous.3 15 In 1974, the California Curriculum Commission
considered the report of the Legal and Factual Analysis Committee,
established pursuant to the aforementioned legislation. 310 The Com-
mission recommended, following some minor revision, the adoption of
all the six or seven thousand books reviewed by the Committee. One
commentator asserted that the Curriculum Commission, uninterested in
requiring content revisions to eliminate sexism, focused almost entirely
on the utility of the books in question (English texts) as reading toolsaIT
The State Board of Education adopted the recommendations of the
Commission, thereby authorizing the use of the texts involved for five
years.318 While it is too early to conclude that the California statute
will be ineffectual, it is clear that strong legislation must be combined
with administrative commitment in order to effectuate change.
Course Offerings and Prograins.-Girls seeking to take vocational
education courses in traditionally male-dominated trades have in the
past faced Catch-22 arguments asserted to support their exclusion. Be-
312. HEW Press Release, Statement by Caspar W. Weinberger, Sccretary of HEW,
June 3, 1975, at 3. A New York Times editorial echoed Weinbergcr's view:
The Department of Health, Education and Welfare has wisely resisted pressures
to include the content of textbooks in its guidelines. Expert studies halc pro.
%ided ample illustrations that many of these teaching materials arc indeed in-
fected with male chatvinism, but Federal censorship is not the remedy. Local
school boards and educators can better re-educate authors antd publishers through
care in selecting teaching materials.
N.Y. Times, June 5, 1975, at 36, col. 1.
313. Cal. Educ. Code § 9243 (West 1975). The California statute prohibits the use
of instructional material which contain "any matter reflecting adersely tpon persons
because of their race, color, creed, national origin, ancestry, sex or occupation."
314. Id. § 9240(a).
315. See Note, Sex Discrimination: The Textbook Case, snpra note 307, at
1330-31.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 1331.
318. Id.
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lieving that even qualified women will be excluded because of their sex
from union membership, school officials have argued that to offer
training to a girl can only deprive a boN of ain actual opportunit\ to
get a job.3 19 Some unions, however, have stated that they would be
quite willing to admit women but cannot find trained applicants."
The final regulations include a general prohibition against swgre-
gating courses or programs or requiring or refusing participation in atl
course or program on the basis of sex.3 21 To counteract the fact that girls
have, in the past, been rarely encouraged to take courses in such male-
dominated areas as the industrial art, 3 2 - the regulations ban sex dis-
crimination in counseling and guidance.32 Speificali) prohibited is the
use of different testing and counseling materials for each sex. OnIN when
such materials cover the same occupations and interest areas and aic
needed to eliminate sex bias is their use allowed.a: 1 Schools are further
required to investigate whether disproportionate representation of one
sex in a class or course of study is the result of the use of discriminator)
counseling materials.32 5
Controversy surrounding the general ban on sexually segregated
classes resulted in the promulgation of certain limitations on the scope
of the regulation. As originally proposed, it would have required sex
integration of all classes, with no exceptions, including health and
physical education.3 2 6 Opponents of the proposal asserted that integrated
physical education classes would lead to greater permissiveness,a -T while
319. "Why should we admit women to %ocational education coaiws on a whim,
even if it is a strong whim, when it will den% admittance to all culploabl male?
The unions won't admit women and the can't get jobs." lIntersiic~ uith Donald
Fowler, Assistant to the California State Dirctor of Vocational Education. Oct. 17.
1973, in Shelton & Berndt, Sex Discrimination in Vocational Education: Title IX and
Other Remedies, 62 Calif. L. Rev. 1121 (1974).
320. "We would love to admit a womnan to the union, but ue can't find anN
qualified or trained in our field." lnterxiew with a union official 1ho ished to
remain anonymous, June 17, 1974, in Shelton & Berndt. supra note 319, at 1121.
321. 45 G.F.R. § 86.34 (1975), which provides in part:
A recipient shall not provide any course or otherwise carr% out an, of its educa-
tion program or acti itN separately on the basis of se\, or it-ltire or refuse
participation therein by any of its students on such basis, including health,
physical education, industrial, business, %ocational. technical. home economics,
music, and adult education courses.
322. Martinez, Sexism in Public Education: Litigation Issues, 18 Intclualiti in
Educ. 5, 7 (1974).
323. 45 C.F.R. § 86.36(a) (1975).
324. Id. § 86.36(b). The regulation also requires institutions to ttablish pro-
cedures to screen out sex bias.
325. Id. § 86.36(c).
326. 39 Fed. Reg. 22235 (1974).
327. More than 250 letters weie rc(cicd bN HEN%\ oplimsing integrated sm and
physical education classes, with oul one in faoi. HEW" .Mecmorandum0 Oct. 1!. 197-1.
at 3.
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supporters argued that they were necessary to allow girls to develop
athletic skills on a par with boys. 328
The final regulation was a compromise: separate classes for boys
and girls may be provided on the primary and secondary levels in courses
which "deal exclusively with human sexuality,"3 2 9 while physical educa-
tion classes must be operated on an integrated basis330 Although separa-
tion within physical education classes is permitted on the basis of skill
differences 331 and separate groupings by sex are allowed in contact
sports,332 the rules do not specify whether students can be denied the
right to participate in a given sport on the basis of lack of skill. Since
exclusion from activity is broadly prohibited and each permissible
separation is carefully delineated, such a denial would probably not be
allowed, unless it could be shown that participation in that activity
would be unreasonably dangerous.333
Admissions.-In prohibiting sex discrimination in admissionsA101
the regulations specifically ban separate sex ranking or quotas.8 35 In
addition, admissions rules concerning marital or parental status are not
permitted unless both sexes are treated similarly.330 Furthermore, ad-
mission preferences cannot be given to applicants on the basis of at-
328. N.Y. Times, July 17, 1975, at 30, col. 1.
329. 45 C.F.R. § 86.34(e) (1975).
330. Id. § 86.34.
331. Id. § 86.34(b).
332. Id. § 86.34(c).
333. Elementary schools are given one year to comply with the ph)sical educa-
tion regulations. Secondary and postsecondary institutions are given three years to
comply. Id. § 86.34(a).
The release of the final regulations did not end the conflict over physical educa-
tion. Congressman James O'Hara sought an amendment to title IX to permit the
operation of physical education classes on a segregated basis. This move was squelched
simultaneously with his amendment exempting revcnuc-producing sports. 121 Cong.
Rec. D832 (daily ed. July 9, 1975). Only one week after the O'Hara Amendment was
killed, the House, by a margin of only one vote, passed the Casey Amendment to tie
Education Appropriations Act of 1975, which would have prohibited HEW from
spending any money to enforce the sex integration of physical education classes. 121
Cong. Rec. H6894-95 (daily ed. July 16, 1975). The Senate, however, deleted the Casey
Amendment fr6m the appropriations act by a 65-29 vote. Id. at S12896 (daily ed.
July 17, 1975). Following the Senate action, the House reversed its previous vote, by
a 215-178 margin, and killed the amendment. Id. at H7046 (daily ed. July 18, 1975).
334. The general prohibition is contained in 45 C.F.R. § 86.21(a) (1975). Ad-
missions regulations apply only to "institutions of vocational education, professional
education, graduate higher education, and public institutions of undergraduate
higher education." Id. § 86.15(d). The scope of the admissions reguladons is linitcd
to these institutions by title IX. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1) (Supp. 1V, 1974).
335. 45 C.F.R. §§ 86.21(b)(1)(i), (ii) (1975).
336. Id. § 86.21(c)(1). For example, this rule would prohibit a college from giving
admission preference to a married man over a married woman due to her potential
maternal status.
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tendance at a predominantly single sex institution, if such practice
results in sex discrimination.337
The use of tests or criteria which have an adverse impact of a
disproportionate nature on one sex are prohibited, absent a showing
that such measures validly predict success and that no sexuall -neutral
alternative is available. 338 This regulation might be read to bar the use
of credentials or experience that only one sex has had the opportunity
to obtain.33 9 Use of the following measures might thus be held to dis.
criminate against women: military service or honors, athletic scholarships
or awards, and membership or leadership in a professional or honorary
society limited to men.3 40
Financial Aid.-The regulations ban sex discrimination in granting
financial assistance. 341 They do not prohibit scholarships or fellowships
funded through sex-restricted domestic or foreign wills, bequests or
trusts, so long as the "overall effect" is nondiscriminatory. 3 z
To assure nondiscrimination, the regulations require that students
who receive awards be selected on the basis of nondiscriminatory cri-
teria, such as financial need or academic achievement, without regard to
the availability of sex-restricted funds.343 No student may be denied an
award solely because of the unavailability of sex-restricted funds to
members of that student's sex.3 44 In other words, a college cannot pass
over number twenty on their list of potential award winners, a woman,
due to lack of funds and then award number twenty-one, a man, a
scholarship available only to men. If the college wants to provide the
sex-restricted award to number twenty-one, it must first find funds from
another source for number twenty.345
In addition, the regulations require that institutions awarding
athletic scholarships "provide reasonable opportunities for such awards
for members of each sex in proportion to the number of students of
each sex participating in interscholastic or intercollegiate atliletics."a34
337. Id. § 86.22. It is difficult to see how the granting of preference. for example.
to graduates of an exclusively male prep school would not be discriminator). Thc
regulations do not offer guidance, however, as to the point at which such practice
becomes discriminatory.
338. Id. § 86.21(b)(2).
339. See Dunkle & Sandier, Sex Discrimination Against Students: Iplications of
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 18 Inequality in Educ. 12, 18 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Dunkle & Sandier].
340. Id. at 18-19.
341. 45 C.F.R. § 86.37(a) (1975).
342. Id. § 86.37(b)(1).
343. Id. § 86.37(b)(2)(i).
344. Id. § 86.37(b)(2)(iii).
345. 40 Fed. Reg. 24133 (1975).
346. 45 C.F.R. § 86.37(c)(1) (1975).
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There is no amplification of the phrase "provide reasonable opportu.
nities." It is unclear whether it means, on the one hand, that femiale
students be given the right to apply for a certain proportion of scholar-
ships, or, on the other hand, that actual scholarship offers be made to a
certain proportion of women. 34 7 Another unresolved issue is whether
the sports scholarship provision is concerned only with the number of
scholarships a school awards, or also with the actual amounts awarded"' 18
It remains to be seen whether either the general aid regulation or the
athletic scholarship provision will be used to prevent an institution
from providing full tuition grants for the men's football team while
granting the same number of nominal scholarship awards for the
women's tennis team.
Behavior and Appearance.-Educational institutions are prohibited
by the regulations from applying different rules of behavior, sanctions,
or other treatment 34 9 and from discriminating in applying personal
appearance rules35 0 on the basis of sex. Both provisions could have a
serious impact on social norms.
The behavior regulation's implicit prohibition of different visita-
tion hours and curfews for male and female college students"' departs
from the law established in one relatively recent case which had upheld
different curfew regulations. In Robinson v. Board of Regents,852 a class
347. OCR has been unwilling to specify the precise nature of an institution's
responsibility under this regulation.
The thrust of the athletic scholarship section is the concept of reasonableness ....
Institutions should assess whether male and female athletes are afforded ap-
proximately the same opportunities to obtain scholarships in sports at com-
parable levels of competition. Where the sports offered or the levels of competition
differ for male and female students, the institution should assess its athletic
scholarship program to determine whether overall opportunities to receive athletic
scholarships are roughly proportionate to the number of students of each sex
participating in intercollegiate athletics.
Letter from Gwendolyn H. Gregory, Office of Policy Coinminications, Office of Civil
Rights, to Annual Survey of American Law, Nov. 11, 1975 [hereinafter cited as Letter
from Gwendolyn 1-1. Gregory, OCR].
348. Section 86.37(c)(1) reads in part: "To the extent that a recipient awards
athletic scholarships or grants-in-aid." Some support can be found for the view that
this phrase refers only to the number of scholarships awarded. Gilbcrt & Williamson
in Hearings on S. 2518, supra note 244, at 304. It has been estimated that 50,000 men
receive athletic scholarships annually as opposed to 50 women. Id.
349. 45 C.F.R. § 86.31(b)(4) (1975). The behavior regulation, for example, would
seem to bar the use of a sanction for boys, such as corporal punishment, that is not
applied to girls.
350. Id. § 86.31(b)(5).
351. Id. § 86.31(b)(4). HEW could have applied, in reference to dornitoy ruleq,
the following rule: "A recipient shall not on the basis of sex, apply different rules
or regulations . ..related to housing." Id. § 86.32(a). Instead, the Department hit-
chosen to apply the behavior rule subsection to complaints in this area. Letter fion
Gwendolyn H. Gregory, OCR, supra note 347.
352. 475 F.2d 707 (6th Cir. 1973).
Imaged with the Pemission of N.Y.U. Annual Survey of American Law
SEX DISCRIMINATION
action by a female college student challenging the validit) of curfew
regulations applicable to women, curfew regulations were imposed on
female students but not on males at the college in question?.3  Second-,
third-, and fourth-year women students were exempted from tile restric-
tions if they maintained a C average, paid a S15 fee, and obtained (if
they were under 21) the consent of their parenLs.331
During the period of litigation, the Regents issued new regulations,
which permitted all women, except for first semester freshmen, to
regulate their own hours if they paid SIO and, if they were under 21,
obtained parental consent.3z5 Plaintiff noted that even the revised
procedures, in requiring parental consent for underage females, applied
a proviso not required of males. 35 Taking judicial notice that women
are more susceptible to physical attack than are men, the court held that
the procedures imposed on females, although different from those ap-
plied to men, were nonetheless reasonable. 357 The validit) of the curfew
regulations was upheld against equal protection challCnge 35b
The title IX regulations will change this result. In fact, prior to the
publication of the proposed regulations, HEW resolved one complaint
challenging discriminatory dormitory rules in favor of the complain-
ant.3 59
The appearance rule does not require the same treatment for both
sexes, as the behavior rule does, but rather only prohibits rules which
are discriminatory.36 0 What constitutes a "discriminator" rule is as )et
unresolved, however. For example, it is unclear whether it is discrimina-
tory to permit only males to wear slacks or to establish one set of hair
regulations for boys and another for girls.
It could be argued that rules, in order to be nondiscriminator%.
must be identical for both sexes. A recent federal district court decision,
however, took exception to that view. In Trent v. Perritt,3 61 the plain-
tiff, a Mississippi high school senior, had been suspended from school
for violating a county-wide regulation prohibiting only male students
353. Id. at 709.
354. Id. at 708-09.
355. Id. at 709.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 711.
358. Id.
359. In a letter from Peter Holmes, Director of OCR. to Senator Walter Mont-
dale, Chairman of the Subcommintee on Education of the Senate Committec on
Labor and Public Welfare, it was noted that complaints in~oiling dormitor regula-
tions against Lousiana State University and the University of Missouri at Columbia
had been resolved in favor of the complainants. Hearings on S. 2518, supra note 244.
at 233.
360. 45 C.F.R. § 86.31(b)(5) (1975).
361. 391 F. Supp. 171 (S.D. Miss. 1975).
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from attending school with hair below the ear lobe or over the collar.80 2
Seeking an injunction against the enforcement of the regulation, plain-
tiff asserted that the imposition of the regulations only upon males
denied him equal protection and violated title IX.3 03
The court dismissed the equal protection claim, asserting that it
would have granted defendant's motion for summary judgment were it
not for the title IX sex discrimination issue.3 04 As to the latter issue,
plaintiff asserted that title IX, as applied through the HEW proposed
regulations on discriminatory appearance rules 0  (adopted verbatim in
the final rules), prohibited enforcement of the grooming rule in ques.
tion.3 60 The court denied plaintiff's claim, narrowly construing the
purpose of title IX to be the provision of federal financial assistance "to
girls as much as to boys under any education program or activity.'"'a 7
The court asserted that, if the term "appearance" meant grooming so as
to "erase all outside physical distinction between the sexes, it aims at a
ridiculous result, one of stereotyping both sexes into one, with little
relation to the purpose of federal funding."3 68
Although the court's federal funding relationship test was inap-
propriate, 360 its holding that the rules in question do not violate title
IX or the appearance regulation is certainly defensible. Had the goal
of the final appearance regulation been identical rules for both scxes,
different rules for each sex would have been specifically prohibited, as
they were in the behavior regulation. 370 Absent such prohibition, the
appearance rule might reasonably be interpreted to allow different rules
if they reasonably pursue the same objective and if compliance with that
objective imposes an equal burden on both sexes. 371
362. Id. The only county regulation applicable to both male and female hah
grooming prohibited students front attending school with rollers in thcir hair or
with distracting hairstyles. Id. at 173.
363. Id. at 171-72.
364. Id. at 172.
365. 39 Fed. Reg. 22232-35 (1974).
366. 391 F. Supp. at 172-73.
367. Id. at 173.
368. Id.
369. A more accurate vicw of congressional intent in enacting title IX would
focus on the desire to guarantee that any educational institution receiving federatl
funds not discriminate on the basis of sex in almost any manner.
370. 45 C.F.R. § 86.31(b)(4) (1975).
371. The following cases were decided prior to the adoption of the HEW regula-
tions and dealt with the sex discrimination issue in constitutional terms. Karr v.
Schmidt, 460 F,2d 609 (5th Cir. 1972) (equal protection challenge rejected under
rational relationship test); Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1970) (freedom to
wear hair as desired is fundamental right and school board failed to mcct substantial
burden of justification for rule); Woods v. Alamo Heights Independent School Dist.,
433 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (school regulation not arbitrary but Is
sufficiently related to proper objective).
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Applying this test to the facts in Trent, the court could have con-
cluded that the hair length rules for boys and the rule applicable to
both sexes prohibiting hair rollers or distracting hair styles were de-
signed to preserve school decorum and minimize student distraction.
Whether the rules were equivalent responses to that goal is open to
question. The school officials, by imposing additional rules concerning
boys' hair length, implied that the general standard on distracting hair
would not have prohibited hair slightly below the collar or ear lobe.
The boys, therefore, were seemingly held to a higher standard than tile
girls, in violation of the regulations' nondiscrimination requirement.
Procedures.-The regulations require that by July 21, 1976 each
institution or program receiving funds evaluate its own practices and
policies, 372 modify all procedures violating the regulations, and take
remedial action to remove the discriminatory effects of such pro-
cedures.373 "Affirmative action" to overcome the effects of past discrimi-
nation is not required, however, in the absence of a finding of dis-
crimination by HEW.374
The regulations also authorize the Director of OCR, upon a finding
of discrimination, to take whatever steps he deems necessary to eliminate
the effects of such practices. 3 75 Every applicant for federal funds is
required under the regulations to submit a written assurance of com-
pliance satisfactory to the Director of OCR.376 The regulations mandate
the designation of at least one employee responsible for the institution's
compliance obligations.377 Furthermore, institutions must establish in-
ternal grievance procedures to resolve complaints.37s
In order to comply with the regulations, fund recipients must notify
students and employees that they do not discriminate on the basis of
sex.379 Initial notification was required by October 19, 1975, through
local and school newspapers as well as direct communications to each
372. 45 C.F.R. § 86.3(c)(i) (1975).
373. Id. §§ 86.3(c)(ii), (iii).
374. Id. § 86.3(b). The affirmative action section included in the proposed regula-
tions was removed from the final version. 40 Fed. Reg. 24127, 24134 (1975).
375. 45 C.F.R. § 86.3(a) (1975).
376. Id. § 86.4.
377. Id. § 86.8(a).
378. Id. § 86.8(b). There has been some criticism of the internal gricvncc pro.
cedure requirement. In a telegram to President Ford, National Education Association
President James A. Harris stated:
By requiring both student and employee complainants to exhaust an internal
grievance procedure prior to action by HEW without setting time limits or other
specific standards for institutional procedures, the regulation may hamper the
proper enforcement of Title IX.
I Women's L. Rep. 1.182 (1975).
379. 45 C.F.R. § 86.9(a) (1975).
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student and employee.3 80 Recipients must also include statements of
nondiscrimination in bulletins and catalogs. 38 1
Although HEW had published proposed consolidated procedures
for all provisions administered by OCR,3 82 the interim procedures
currently in use for title IX are those applicable to title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. 383 The title VI procedures permit discrimina-
tion complaints to be brought by an individual in his or her own behalf
or for a specific class.3 84 The Director of OCR is also required promptly
to investigate any "possible failure" of compliance indicated by a com-
plaint, compliance review, or "other information."' 8 5 In addition to
responding to complaints, the Director is required to make periodic
compliance reviews of fund recipients, although no specific guidelines
are established for such reviews.3 80
The interim procedures require OCR to notify the recipient of
findings of noncompliance and to negotiate voluntary compliance
wherever possible.387 If informal efforts fail, OCR can use any other
means authorized by law,3 88 or, subsequent to an opportunity for hear-
ing and proper notification to Congress, can terminate or refuse to
grant funding.389 Title VI procedures also provide for judicial review
of any departmental action which results in the refusal to grant funding
or the termination of funding.39 0
HEW, stimulated by a recent court order in Adams v. Vein.
berger,3 91 proposed consolidated procedures for all provisions adminis-
tered by OCR.392 The district court in Adams ordered HEW to investi-
gate "all complaints or other information of racial discrimination in
violation of Title VII."3'a 3 HEW was further ordered to begin enforce-
ment proceedings when voluntary compliance had failed.3 94 The pro-
posed regulations, recently withdrawn by the agency due to "over-
380. Id. § 86.9(a)(2).
381. Id. § 86.9(b)(1).
382. 40 Fed. Reg. at 24151-59.
383. 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.6-.11 (1975). The use of title VI procedures is specifically
provided for in the final regulation. Id. § 86.71.
384. Id. § 80.7(b).
385. Id. § 80.7(c).
386. Id. § 80.7(a).
387. Id. § 80.8(d).
388. Id.
389. Id. § 80.8(c).
390. Id. § 80.11.
391. 391 F. Supp. 269 (D.D.C. 1975), enforcing 351 F. Supp. 636 (D.D.C. 1972), 350
F. Supp. 92 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd with modification, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
392. 40 Fed. Reg. at 24151-59.
393. 391 F. Supp. at 273.
394. Id.
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whelmingly negative" public comment,395 would have given HEWV the
discretion to investigate complaints on an elective basis.3" 6 In an effort
essentially to establish the policy behind the discarded proposed regula-
tions, HEW has sought a permanent modification of the Adams order
which would require the investigation of only one-quarter of all com-
plaints received. 39 7
Conclusion.-Despite its limitations upon the general goal of elimi-
nating sex-discrimination from educational programs and institutions,
title IX, as enforced through the HENV regulations, is a significant piece
of legislation whose impact cannot be measured solely by the scope of
its coverage and enforcement. The statute has already engendered a
ripple effect. It has ameliorated the climate for the passage of similar
state legislation 39s and influenced the adjudication of questions outside
the precise scope of the law.3 - 9
395. N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1976, at 9, col. 1.
396. The essence of the proposal is to articulate the Department's role in civil
rights enforcement in terms of a methodical approach geared rousard identif)ing
and eliminating sxstemic discrimination rather than in terms of a rcactihc or
complaint-oriented approach geared to%%ard securing indihidnal relic for persons
claiming discrimination.
40 Fed. Reg. at 24148. See id. at 24152-53.
397. N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1976, at 9, col. 1. The Agenc% has based its rtcquet
for the modification on the inadequacy of the OCR staff level. Id. It should be noted,
however, that no request for an increase in staff had been made by HEW tuntil last
year. Id.
398. E.g., Minn. Stat. Ann. § 363.03-5(l)(2) (Supp. 1975). which pro~idcs:
It is an unfair discriminatory practice: (1) To discriminate in any manner in the
full utilization of or benefit from any educational institution . .. because of ...
sex.... (2) To exclude, expel or otherwise discriminate against a person stking
admission as a student, or a person enrolled as a student because of ... sex.
399. E.g., in Berkelman v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 501 F2d 126-1 t9th
Cir. 1974), the court invalidated the use of higher admissions standards for girls than
for boys seeking entrance to a special public college preparatory high school. Al-
though basing its holding on the equal protection clause and noting the technical
inapplicability of title IX since secondary school admissions are not covered by title
IX, the court cited Congress's intent in enacting title IX to support its holding. Id.
at 1269-70.
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